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process inwhich subordinate group demands for greater access to high-
status categories are met with reversals in the hierarchy of existing cat-
egories. The analysis addresses a school district’s response to pressure
from a racial desegregationmovement to improve black access to a high-
status majority-white disability category. The district complied, but it
also allowedwhites tomigrate to a low-statusmajority-black category,
fromwhichblacks thenwere excluded.This categorywas enhancedwith
benefits desirable to whites. The original categorical hierarchy was re-
stored during resegregation 20 years later. In categorical manipulation,
subordinate groups gain greater access to high-status categories, but
these categories suffer in value as dominant groups reaffiliatewith pre-
viously low-status categories,whichmaybe revised for improvements.
This is different frommore familiar forms of resistance to change such
as symbolic compliance, ritualization, and tokenism.Rising levels of social and economic inequality have stimulated renewed inter-
est in organizations’ role in that process (Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey, and
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Categorization by Organizationswhich organizations contribute to inequality is to categorize people in ways
that configure unequal distribution of resources, rewards, and opportunities
(Tilly 1998). Subordinate groups such aswomen, racial/ethnicminorities, im-
migrants, and the economically disadvantaged face exclusion from high-status
categories not just in employment (e.g., more prestigious or lucrative jobs;
Stainback et al. 2010) but also in the organizational “activity environment”
where clients, audiences, and constituencies are categorized. For instance, mi-
norities face exclusion from high-ability tracks in schools (Oakes 2005) and
favorable lending categories in banks (Ross and Yinger 2002).2
Exclusion can persist when organizations face pressure for greater subordi-
nate group access to high-status categories. Studies of responses to such pres-
sure typically address employment and focus on strategies that protect dom-
inant group control over high-status jobs, such asmaking tokenistic gestures
(Sutton and Dobbin 1996), ritualizing change (Kalev and Dobbin 2008), re-
interpreting and subvertingmandates (Edelman 1992), coopting adversaries
(Oliver 1991), and ignoring or defying pressure for change (Zald,Morrill, and
Rao 2005). We address a previously unstudied strategy, categorical manipu-
lation, inwhich instead of protecting dominant group control over high-status
categories, the organization enables dominant group affiliation with low-
status categories.While subordinate groups gain greater access to high-status
categories, dominant groups move down to low-status ones that become new
territories of advantage. Inequality is maintained by reranking existing cat-
egories. Overlooking this is problematic, as subordinate group access to cus-
tomarily high-status categories may be mistaken for equality while it pre-
serves inequality.
In what follows, we first describe categorical manipulation, drawing ini-
tially on literatures outside of research on organizations and inequality, as
the latter lacks accounts of categorical manipulation. This sets the stage for
our discussion of why categorical manipulation has not been addressed in re-
lation to organizations.We then explain how this concept extends research on
organizations and inequality and address conditions under which categorical
manipulation is more likely to occur. The analysis addresses manipulation of
mild disability categories in schools. It focuses on a district where a racial de-2 Our notion of “activity environment” is inspired in part by the classical concept of “task
environment,”which addresses external influences on organizational behavior.Weuse the
term activity environment to highlight influences in the opposite direction, that is, organi-
zations’—including employees’—influence on actors and groups with whom they inter-
act. The realm of such influence is not solely outside of organizational boundaries, which
is how “environment” typically is understood. It also can include internal settings where
the organization interacts with clients, audiences, and constituencies, such as classrooms
in schools, care units in hospitals, and shopping areas in retail stores. The notion of activity
environment is critical in addressing the broad range of domains in which organizations
categorize people outside of theworkplace,which is only one domain of categorization, the
domain that receives primary attention in research on organizations and inequality.
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Allsegregation effort demanded greater black access to a high-status majority-
white category. By “high status,”wemean less stigmatizing and academically
more “mainstream” than other mild disability categories. While the district
complied,we examinewhether thiswas coupledwithwhitemigration to apre-
viously low-statusmajority-black category andwhether this categorywas in-
fused with new status and benefits in the process.DESCRIBING CATEGORICAL MANIPULATION
In status competition, a category is a statusmarker signifyingdistinction (Bour-
dieu 1984; Tilly 1998).3 Given its focus on the workplace, research on orga-
nizations and inequality views work roles as categories over which groups
compete. In the work context, status competition is typically unidirectional,
involving upward movements along the hierarchy of categories: dominant
groups tend to vacate high-status jobs only to move up to new, more advan-
tageous jobs as subordinate groups strive to catch up and emulate (Reskin
andRoos 1990). Thus, categories often are conceived of as rungs on a ladder
individuals (and groups) climb up in competition for advantage. Relatedly,
inequality is seen as persisting by way of crafting low-status jobs for subor-
dinate groups (Acker 1990;Wingfield andAlston 2014), devaluing any job that
becomes affiliated with such groups (Bradley 1989; England 1992) and re-
stricting subordinate group entry into jobs located higher on the ladder
(Maume 1999;Ridgeway 2011).The reranking of existing categories remains
out of view, a process in which rungs on the ladder itself are reordered. We
refer to it as categorical manipulation. Here, subordinate groups are no longer
excluded from high-status categories, but the organization facilitates down-
ward movement of dominant groups to low-status categories that become new
markers of distinction. Given its unidirectional view, the literature on organi-
zations and inequality lacks accounts of categorical manipulation.We present
three examples from broader sociological research to illustrate the process.
The first account is from Pearlman’s (2013) study of change in the Amer-
ican gourmet restaurant style. In the mid-20th century, French cuisine, tiedCategories comprise not just statusmarkers in institutional spheres such as employment
nd education (e.g., jobs, degrees) but also the identities of groups that compete for such
arkers (e.g., male/female, white/nonwhite, and affluent/poor). Since advantages of any
iven category can be used to attain other categories (Bourdieu 1984), identities related to
ace, class, and gender play a critical role in status competition as embodiments of priv-
ege or lack thereof. Therefore, we will use such identities at times as shorthand for
dominant” and “subordinate” groups. But we do not negate the fact that these identities
nd others such as native/immigrant) are also categories, which like other categories, are
ubject to status competition. Given the conditions, these categories also can be reframed,
evalued, and even reranked byway of contentious processes in which organizational ac-
rs take part, such as the state and the media (e.g., on the formation and evolution of3
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Categorization by Organizationsto highly formal dining, marked elite gourmet culture. But as French cui-
sine was popularized inmiddle-class restaurants and households in postwar
decades (e.g., as a result of Julia Child’s TV show), elite restaurants embraced
emblems of mass culture and comfort food such as hamburgers and hot dogs.
Elite chefs incorporated these into theirmenus andupgraded themwithhigh-
end ingredients and side dishes inaccessible to the masses, gradually abandon-
ing French cuisine as the central marker of distinction. Ramdoyal (1977) doc-
uments a similar process in the educational context ofMauritius,where private
education was a marker of nonelite status before decolonization. Common-
ers fortunate enough to receive education did so only to a limited degree in ill-
equipped, low-cost private schools, while elites, including children of colonial
masters, received free and superior education in well-funded state schools in-
accessible to the masses. In the postcolonial era, as state schools opened to
all citizens, elites migrated to the private sector, renovating existing private
schools and establishing new ones, excluding the masses in the process. An-
other example is provided by DeNora’s (1991) study of musical patronage
in early 19th-century Vienna. As the economic and organizational bases of
musical sponsorship democratized, musical taste of Viennese aristocrats, who
favored Italian opera styles (simple, short, aesthetic pieces performed by
private house ensembles), was mimicked by the nonaristocratic rich. In re-
sponse, aristocrats emphasized musical sophistication (long, complex pieces)
as a key artistic feature, embodied most notably by then deceased Mozart,
whose music was enjoyed in preceding years by the nonaristocratic rich. Re-
turning Mozart to aristocratic favor and devaluing Italian styles restored
“serious music” as Vienna’s dominant genre, including works of Mozart’s
contemporaries such as Beethoven and Haydn. Aristocrats reclaimed musi-
cal authority bymaking seriousmusic the centerpiece of performances hosted
in aristocratic salons and then by showcasing it for the “less learned” public
in various concert halls, a pattern of musical sponsorship often beyond the
means of the nonaristocratic rich.
When privilege is challenged, it can be maintained not just by restricting
access to existing high-status categories or by climbing up the hierarchy of cat-
egories but also by reranking existing categories. Without this extension, in-
quiry can overlook a key modality by which dominant group interests are
protected. In each account above, the dominant group engages in downward
movement, toward a low-status category affiliated with the subordinate group
that faces reduced access to that category. Such reaffiliation can imprint new
status on the category (Berger and Heath 2008), but this also may require
revision to technical attributes (Halnon and Cohen 2006). Revision can in-
volve alterations in attributes, such as upgrading American comfort food
with better ingredients and side dishes or refurbishing theMauritian private
school sector with better facilities and instruction. But it also can involve re-
interpretation of attributes for valuation, that is, respecifying whether an at-187
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Alltribute is relevant to category valuation or whether more of the attribute is
better than less (or vice versa). Although the Viennese aristocracy continued
to treat degree of sophistication as relevant to genre valuation, they empha-
sized high (over low) sophistication as a mark of value to reelevate Mozart’s
style. Reaffiliation and revision endow a category with benefits, both sym-
bolic (prestige) and substantive (social and economic advantage), and help
maintain inequality (Bourdieu 1984). In sum, categoricalmanipulation involves
overcoming a threat to privilege by moving down to a low-status category,
revaluing it, and excluding its previous members to secure the category’s
new benefits.CATEGORICAL MANIPULATION BY ORGANIZATIONS
Downwardmovements are documented in research on organizations, regard-
ing, for example, gender gaps in employment. Employers enable male move-
ment into lower status female jobswhen economic downturns limit job supply
(Reskin and Roos 1990) or when female jobs become more appealing (e.g.,
male entry to nursing because of rising demand and rewards for nurses;Cross
and Bagilhole 2002) or when masculinizing a female job improves organiza-
tional legitimacy (see Arndt and Bigelow [2005] onmasculinization of female
hospital administration jobs to bolster confidence in hospitals). But in none
of these cases is downward movement a response to pressure for equality; it
is a means of adapting to or taking advantage of changes in broader condi-
tions to perpetuate unchallenged privilege. Categorical manipulation, by
contrast, involves downward movement to rerank existing categories in re-
sponse to pressure for equality. This process has not been exposed by orga-
nizational research, or in pertinent work on occupations, mainly because the
malleability of categorical arrangements (the degree to which they are open
to reranking) has not figured into problem framing in examining inequality
in employment. For instance, some basic authority distinctions, such as up-
per versusmiddle management (which receivemuch attention in analyses of
gender and racial sorting; Smith 2002) are characterized by lowmalleability,
as reranking them (and others such as director and assistant) can untenably
violate upward concentration of authority. This is why greater female and
minority access to managerial ranks is often accompanied by moving the
glass ceiling up within management (Padavic and Reskin 2002) rather than
reranking higher and lower levels. But various other authority distinctions are
more open to reranking, such as vaguely differentiated titles like vice pres-
ident versus executive director or senior manager versus managing director.
The politics of job titles (fake promotions and demotions and job title infla-
tion) are a common way in which disparities are maintained (Reskin and
Padavic 2006).188
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Categorization by OrganizationsMalleability varies across categorical hierarchies involving differences in
occupational expertise as well, hierarchies that also are central in gender
and racial sorting (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993; Charles and Grusky 2005).
For instance,within a given occupation,when jobs are differentiated in terms
of auxiliary and principal roles (e.g., paralegal vs. lawyer), in terms of gener-
alized and specialized (i.e., competitive) expertise (e.g., family medicine vs.
neurosurgery), or in terms of demands and the problem variety inherent to
different task domains (e.g., elementary vs. high school principalship), re-
ranking the jobs may be difficult as it would violate valuation by complexity
and related knowledge and skill (Mintzberg 1979). But jobs that are more
proximal in these respects are more open to reranking. For example, these
can be gendered jobs such as butler versus housekeeper, where the former
is masculinized and seen as superior and rewarded more (Lethbridge 2013).
But the rise of female butlers (see Ellyatt 2013) may lead to greater male entry
into and revisions in housekeeping (revaluing its distinct tasks, expanding its
jurisdiction). Employers can reward a “male” job over a “female” one even
when the jobs involve similar complexity, knowledge, skill, and effort (Le-
vanon, England, and Allison 2009). As for between-occupation differences
(e.g., lawyer vs. accountant), reranking may be problematic unless func-
tional, technoeconomic, or cultural bases of valuation are altered (Abbott
1988). It is difficult to devalue financial analysts in a bank, devalue web de-
signers in an internet economy, or cast midwives as more prestigious than
obstetricians in a culture that values jobs affiliated with science (Zhou 2005).
But such bases of valuation do not foreclose possibilities for change in occu-
pational rankings, and, depending on conditions, the bases of valuation them-
selves may be subject to change. Cases of this in relation to struggles for re-
valuing jobs are well documented both at the organization level (e.g., see
Barley [1986] on radiologists vs. technologists in hospitals and Bechky
[2003] on engineers vs. assemblers in manufacturing sites) and at the field
level (e.g., see Abbott [1988] on architects vs. urban planners in the early
20th-century United States and on “faith healers” vs. medical doctors in
Old Regime France). Whether differentiation is by bureaucratic authority
or occupational expertise, or both, limited attention to variation inmalleabil-
ity of categorical arrangements in the division of labor prevents exploring
categorical manipulation as a form of resistance to pressure for equality and
the role that organizations play in the process.ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY ENVIRONMENT AS A CONTEXT
OF CATEGORIZATION AND INEQUALITY
Limiting the scope of inquiry to the employment context is another factor that
may impede the study of categorical manipulation, as employment is not the189
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Allonly context inwhich organizations categorize people. Categorization also oc-
curs in the activity environment involving clients, audiences, and constituen-
cies. Governments categorize citizens, schools label students, hospitals catego-
rize patients, insurers classify policy holders, the police profile civilians, record
companies classify fans, and real estate agencies label home buyers. Recog-
nizing such domains of categorization expands the conceptual and analytic
utility of the concept of categorical manipulation. Thus, we address the the-
oretical underpinnings of categorization in the activity environment and how
domains in that context vary in terms of malleability of categorical hierar-
chies, offering a rich array of opportunities to observe and examine categor-
ical manipulation by organizations (our empirical analysis addresses manip-
ulation of mild disability categories in schools).
Given their ontological status as reality constructors, organizations catego-
rize clients, audiences, and constituencies in ways that affect cognition and
identities across societal sectors (Scott 2008). This in part stems from the abil-
ity to create product and service categories and to define related needs and
interests (Durand, Granqvist, and Tyllström 2017). Another element is pro-
fessional expertise, as professions are “great rationalizers” that classify people
by means of their work in and through organizations (DiMaggio 1988). Cat-
egorization also can mirror organizational segmentation of expertise (Mintz-
berg 1979). Schools, for instance, structure their expertise into regular and
special education, which can be imposed on students regardless of their true
needs (Skiba et al. 2008).Moreover, just as they create employment categories
at the field level (Strang andBaron 1990), organizations create field-level cat-
egories about clients, audiences, and constituencies (Mohr andDuquenne 1997).
This is enabled by influence over ideas and resources, networks that trans-
mit practices across organizations, tendencies for mutual mimicry, and a ca-
pacity for strategic coordination (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). All these pro-
cesses tend to favor dominant groups through multiple mechanisms. A key
factor is the greater presence of dominant groups in units where categoriza-
tion is performed, as this work can involve homosocial reproduction (Kanter
1977; e.g., a white police officer may label a white suspect as cooperative but
a black one, with similar outlook and behavior, as dangerous). Such biases
also can be reproduced by others who are influenced by broader prejudices
(Weick 1995; e.g., black police officers may be just as prone as white ones to
prematurely assign criminality to black suspects; Lott andMoody 2016). An-
other factor is dominant group influence by political and economic means
such as issue advocacy and financial support (Zald et al. 2005). For example,
the corporate elite lobby for legal categories facilitating privileged political
participation (see Winkler [2018] on the history of “corporations are people”
argument). Finally, organizations may favor dominant groups out of self-
interest (Perrow2014).Hospitals, for instance, can classify patientswith health
insurance as higher risk than patients who have similar problems but no in-190
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Categorization by Organizationssurance, a strategy that offers advantaged patients broader services while
also increasing revenue (Goodrick and Salancik 1996).
Categorization in the activity environment can underlie patterns of in-
equality similar to those in employment and can occasion pressure for equal-
ity, responses to which include categorical manipulation. The activity envi-
ronment comprises a broad spectrumofmalleable categorical arrangements.
At the low end are domains in which categories are less open to reranking,
such as medicine where disease attributes and diagnostic criteria are scien-
tifically specified, and the logic of interpreting disease attributes for valua-
tion is biologically given (lethality, pain, and impairment; Bowker and Star
1999).4 At the high end are domains such as literature and the arts where cat-
egories can be more slippery because subjective judgment and taste play a
key role in group affiliation with categories (genres) and in determining cat-
egory attributes and interpreting them for valuation (Bourdieu 1984). This
provides organizations in the field of cultural production significant influence
over categorical hierarchies. For instance, see Greenfeld (1988) on art galler-
ies devaluing innovative styles to protect mainstream works and audiences
andKnowlton (2005) on libraries creating low-status categories for works by
Native Americans compared to categories for similar works by “Western”
authors. The spectrum of low to high malleability in the activity environ-
ment includesmany domains that offer opportunities to examine categorical
manipulation. Below, we illustrate two such domains where nascent trends
appear to be consistent with categorical manipulation and may therefore
warrant systematic examination from this standpoint in the future. We then
address conditions under which categorical manipulation ismore likely. This
includes a methodical parameterization of malleability to help differentiate
conditions of high and low malleability.
“New urbanites” in housing markets.—After the 2008 housing crash, de-
clining home prices in inner-ring suburbs made these locations more acces-
sible to low-income urbanminority buyerswho took advantage of relocation
grants and vouchers (Hyra 2012). Subsequently, as home prices began to sta-
bilize, the same metro areas experienced upticks in gentrification of urban
neighborhoods by white suburban buyers (Frey 2011; Goetz 2011). Hyra
(2012) asserts that, while group movements in metro space are affected by
several factors, there is no question that low-income residents’ movement
into the suburbs is a factor in recent waves of inner-city gentrification. This
is facilitated by real estate agencies that help white buyers gentrify urban lo-
cations, buyers who are dubbed the “new urbanites” (Weber 2011). Agencies’
profitmotive, control ofmarket information, andnetworks influence this pro-4 These factors do not eliminate bias inmedical diagnosis. Rather, they limit the feasibility
of reranking diseases as a particular means of discrimination and exclusion. Biased cate-
gorization of patients can be pervasive in medicine (e.g., see Hoberman 2012).
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Allcess. Agencies also bring better financing options to gentrifying neighbor-
hoods, which works in conjunction with other revisions such as better city
services (Moskowitz 2017). In addition, gentrifying locations benefit from ur-
ban charter schools, which attract households with children (Pearman and
Swain 2017). Rising home prices and taxes in gentrifying locations limit ac-
cess to these places. Ultimately, affluent white’s reaffiliation with and the re-
lated revision of urban spaces help them outrank suburban spaces to which
low-income minority residents relocate, which are viewed by some as “slum-
burbs” (Capps 2015).
“War stress” in mental health.—Women’s health activists have been ad-
vocating for greater access to the posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) label
for womenmanifesting related symptoms (Linder 2004). PTSD—a combina-
tion of anxiety, stress, and depression due to a life-threatening experience—
has been a predominantly male label owing to lobbying efforts of Vietnam
veterans. It is less stigmatizing than anxiety, stress, or depression alone, as
it denotes an external trauma outside the control of the individual, who thus
is seen as a victim (Linder 2001). It also provides a wider set of services given
its multifaceted nature. Although traumas for women, such as domestic vio-
lence, historically have resulted in anxiety and stress labels more often than
PTSD (Becker and Lamb 1994), women with such traumas are making in-
roads to PTSD (Tolin and Foa 2006). For some males, this potentially tar-
nishes PTSD’s reputation and limits access to resources for PTSD treatment
(Linder 2004). Relatedly, the institutional discourse on male veterans with
PTSD symptoms increasingly uses stress and anxiety labels but with revi-
sions such as “war stress” (see Russell andFigley 2013) and “war-related anx-
iety” (see Toomey et al. 2007). However, this trend cannot grow, and gen-
dered label reputations and resources cannot change, without mental health
institutions who play a central role in the construction and reconstruction of
disorder labels (Poland and Caplan 2004).CONDITIONS FOR CATEGORICAL MANIPULATION
BY ORGANIZATIONS
There are three basic conditions for categorical manipulation. These pertain
to the activity environment as well as to employment. The first one is scope
conditions, which are about malleability: the greater the malleability of cat-
egorical arrangements, the more feasible the manipulation. The second one
is pressure conditions, denoting the push for equality. Manipulation is more
likely in reaction to strong pressure for change, as weak pressure may not
disrupt the status quo, regardless of malleability. And finally, constraining
conditions denote obstacles to upward mobility (to climbing up the ladder
of status markers), which are related to the unattainability or unavailability
of new categories.192
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Categorization by OrganizationsScope Conditions (Malleability)
Malleability denotes the viability of categorical reaffiliation and revision.
Reaffiliation is affected by the strength and utility of rules for matching cat-
egory attributes with attributes of thosewho are categorized. This can be un-
derstood in terms of four factors. First, the less codified the rules, the easier
the reaffiliation (Langwiler 2009). For example, limited formal criteria for
classifying an activity as “athletic” (Sheehan 2013) allows sports media orga-
nizations to help NASCAR drivers relabel themselves as athletes (Martinelli
2017).5 Second, the less uniform the rules, the easier the reaffiliation (Bowker
and Star 1999). Despite codification, diagnostic rules for many psychiatric
disorders are open to interpretation by mental health providers and also can
change over time, as illustrated by trends in PTSD labeling (see also Hartung
andWidiger 1998). Third, the less observable the category attributes, the easier
the reaffiliation (Rosch 1978). Considering psychiatric disorders again, reaf-
filiation is enabled by limited observability of certain latent symptoms,which
limit accuracy indiagnosis, unlike the robust observability of biological symp-
toms that impose greater precision (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). And fourth,
category overlaps make reaffiliation easier, as persons may be matched to
a category different from before on the basis of the same criteria (Ross and
Murphy1999). Somemunicipal governments reclassify owners of “tinyhouses”
(ecofriendly dwellings onwheels) as owners of “granny flats” (a small cottage
typically located in the backyard of a single-family home; Kirk 2018), which
provides tiny house owners with access to hip downtown “mobile home
zones” and other attractive urban spaces and also increases municipal reve-
nues. The more one or more of these factors figures into categorization, the
easier it is for organizations to help groups switch categories.
Categorical revision involves alteration of categories’ technical attributes
or their reinterpretation for valuation. Altering attributes (adding new attri-
butes or dropping existing ones) is a function of the degree to which attri-
butes can be changed on the basis of subjective judgment or taste (Mervis
and Rosch 1981; Bourdieu 1984). This is facilitated by category overlaps
(also noted above) and flexible category definitions. Overlaps in this sense in-
volve shared attributes that create similarities that can be exploited to trans-
fer unshared attributes across categories (Brownell and Caramazza 1978).
In reranking advertising director and public relations manager roles, an em-
ployer may find it easy to recast distinct tasks of one job as belonging to the
other and transfer them over since the two jobs are highly overlapping de-
spite differences (e.g., although the advertising director typically has greater
influence on corporate branding, this task also can be performed by the pub-5 This may be a strategy to counteract NASCAR’s declining popularity and fan base in
the face of growing popularity and media coverage of previously less popular sports like
soccer (see Boren 2014).
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Alllic relationsmanager; see Field 2005). Such transfers are less plausible across
distal jobs such as trucking and aviation. As for flexible (or loose) category
definitions, they facilitate alteration by obscuring which attributes belong
to a category andwhich do not, irrespective of overlaps (Durand and Paolella
2013). It is problematic for dermatologists to selectively drop certain symp-
toms of eczema or add symptoms to it (even by transferring attributes from
a neighboring disease such as psoriasis) since eczema is a rigidly defined con-
dition despite similarities with neighboring disorders (a mental disorder ex-
ample is schizophrenia, overlapping with bipolar disorder). In contrast, au-
tism, once a highly stigmatizing label given negative features such as social
detachment, has been revalued by stretching its definition to include positive
traits like creativity and high intellect (the “Rain Man” effect), a process in
which mental health institutions played a central role (Wolff 2004).
As opposed to altering category attributes, reinterpreting them for valua-
tion is a function of the degree to which attributes’ significance can be recast
on the basis of subjective judgment or taste (Zuckerman 2017). Two types
of reinterpretation are relevant. The first, valuation relevance, is the extent
to which an attribute bears on valuation (Peter, Olsson, and Olsson 2003).
Paramedics (predominantly male) often cast their ability to perform surgery
(e.g., field amputations, postmortem cesarean sections) as a valuation-relevant
attribute of their job relative to (predominantly female) physician’s assis-
tants who cannot perform surgery without a doctor present (Powers 2005).
Nutritionmarketers classify consumers of unhealthy foods as “healthy eaters”
by specifying formerly nonsalient features of unhealthy foods as valuation
relevant. Once seen as harmful given its saturated fat content, butter is in-
creasingly portrayed as healthy given its other features such as vitamins,min-
erals, and fatty acids, arguably linked to high energy and brain function
(Bjork 2016; for an opposing view, see Zong et al. [2016]). The second type
of reinterpretation concerns valuation direction: whether more or less of the
attribute is better (Zuckerman 2017). Competition between life coaches and
counselors is a case in point. Counselors are held in higher regard for focusing
on clients’ past issues to facilitate change, akin to traditional therapy (Pater-
son 2008). But coaches advocate focusing more on the future, claiming that
negativity of the past can be restrictive (Grant 2003). This is similar to the
Viennese aristocracy emphasizing high over low sophistication inmusic to re-
value Mozart’s style.
Ultimately, reaffiliation and revision can be culturally contingent, as cul-
tural facts can take on an objective character, constraining other changeswithin
them (Abbott 1988). As noted earlier, it may be difficult to alter or reinterpret
attributes of midwifery enough for it to outrank obstetrics given the greater
reputation of occupations affiliated with science in Western culture. Likewise,
while record companies market hip hop to affluent white teens to help grow its
popularity, this seldom extends to gangsta rap, which promotes crime and is194
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Categorization by Organizationsseen by many as bad taste (Kitwana 2005). Cultural facts can affect mallea-
bility also by distorting or eclipsing natural facts (Zuckerman 2012). Limited
evidence on the benefits of breast-feeding helped food manufacturers cast
mothers using infant formula as wiser than breast feeders (Schuman 2003),
a ranking that is increasingly reversed as evidence favoring breast-feeding
grows (Chong 2015).Pressure Conditions
Under conditions of highmalleability, strong pressure for equal access to high-
status categories increases the likelihood of categorical manipulation. We dif-
ferentiate between two types of pressure: contention and infiltration. Con-
tentious pressure on organizations targets actively enforced exclusion. This
typically arises by way of egalitarian movements, which, in efforts to reduce
disparities, can counter related organizational practices. Organizations are
less able to resist this when movements are well resourced, take advantage of
mobilization opportunities, and make compelling arguments (McAdam and
Scott 2005). Classic examples are the Civil Rights and women’s movements.
Whenmobilizing powers of thesemovementswere greatest, they helpedmake
significant progress in reducing inequality in a range of categories, such as em-
ployment, education, sports, and popular culture (Stainback andTomaskovic-
Devey 2012).
In contrast to contention, infiltration violates a distinction perpetuated
less by actively enforced exclusion than by structural barriers such as income
orwealth differentials, segmented social networks, disparities in cultural cap-
ital, and norms discouraging equal access to high-status categories (Parkin
2001).This is analogous to gaining greater access to a territory protectedmore
by material, social, or cultural distance than by a guarded gate. Social move-
ments can play a role in infiltration when they improve subordinate group
capacity, emboldening entry into unguarded or weakly guarded categories.
In early phases of the disability rights movement, parents of disabled school-
age children,whowere not considered “students” andwere excludedby custom
frompublic schools, infiltrated the student category byworkingwith sympa-
thetic administrators to create special classrooms in schools, without major
contentionwith incumbent parents or state agencies (Carey 2009). Infiltration
also can be caused by the exogenousweakening of structural barriers, such as
the 2008 housing crash making prices in inner-ring suburbs more affordable
for low-income urban minority buyers, which created market pressure on
real estate agencies to pursue new profit opportunities. Finally, infiltration can
be caused by cultural movements or trends not directly addressing inequality
but affecting broader beliefs in ways that nonetheless level the playing field.
The health food movement encourages and enables (via lower prices) mass
consumers to prefer organic, genetically unmodified food, once accessible195
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Allmainly to high-income consumers (Martino 2018). This puts market pressure
on grocery chains to reclassify mass consumers as healthy eaters and expand
health food sections in store branches beyond those in high-income locations
(Patton and Giamonna 2015; Meyersohn 2019).
Strong pressure, whether in the form of contention, infiltration, or both, re-
duces viability of evasion by strategies familiar in organizational sociology,
such as disregarding or challenging the pressure, engaging in symbolic re-
sponses, coopting adversaries, or reinterpreting the pressure. But depending
on malleability of categorical arrangements, categorical manipulation can
protect dominant group interests as long as power differentials persist. Lim-
its on the strength and utility of categorical matching rules provides organi-
zations with discretion to enable downwardmovement for dominant groups,
discretion that, in itself, can signal the legitimacy of matching decisions while
concealing biases (Handler 1986). Discretion also can legitimize categorical
revisions. Themore the category attributes can be altered or reinterpreted on
the basis of subjective judgment or taste, the more organizational actors can
rely on their ownpreferences, ormediate those of dominant groups, in revising
categories. Such revisions can be difficult to challenge if subordinate groups
remain relationally disadvantaged. In some cases, categorical revisions may
be unjudicable, as changes in judgment and taste are not always open to dis-
pute (see Zuckerman 2012).Constraining Conditions
The third factor in the likelihood of categorical manipulation is the strength
of constraints on upward movement along the hierarchy of categories. Ma-
nipulation ismore likelywhen climbing up the ladder of statusmarkers is less
viable in response to strong pressure for equality from below.6 This occurs in
two ways. First, a new, more advantageous category may be unattainable
even if available. Movement of low-income minority buyers into inner-ring
suburbs may trigger urban gentrification since at least some white suburban
buyers may be unable to afford homes in outer-ring suburbs and elite “ex-
burbs.”Dominance is a relational condition relative to the position ofweaker
groups and, thus,may not imply unbounded agency. Second, an entirely new,
more advantageous category may be unavailable and difficult to construct.
Such construction implies adding a fresh element to the existing stock of
knowledge, which typically requires significant resources and is prone to in-
volving conflict over label, meaning, and attributes (Bowker and Star 1999).We do not argue that weak constraints on upward movement necessarily make categor-
almanipulation less likely,whichwould imply that upwardmovement is inherentlymore
referable than downward movement when both options are similarly viable. Rather, we
ontend that strong constraints on upward mobility make categorical manipulation the6
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more likely alternative.
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Categorization by OrganizationsAlso, differentiating a new category from existing ones can involve prolonged
struggles to establish the distinction. This can be particularly problematic for
organizations when categories are subject to field-level legitimation (DiMag-
gio 1991). Moreover, constructing a new category can be hindered by the dis-
ciplining effect of existing categories. As sense-making devices, categories be-
come habitual and mitigate against new categories to define and understand
the world (Zuckerman 2017). Not only may audiences be unwilling to aban-
don existing categories, but organizational actors may be unable to break from
such categories in their own thinking. Financial entrepreneurs face difficulty
in institutionalizing the bitcoin as a new type of currency (a form of decen-
tralized, stateless cryptocurrency) because of resistance from state actors and
the reluctance of consumers to abandon the idea of “cash” (Golumbia 2016).
Downward movement can help overcome the unattainability problem
since low-status categories are likely to be more attainable. It also can help
avoid the cost of constructing an entirely new category when revisions to
a low-status one require less resources (Durand and Paolella 2013). In addi-
tion, revision can help avoid complete makeovers, as limited changes can
help elevate a low-status category above a previously high-status one (Hal-
non 2002). Finally, downward movement reduces the need to differentiate
the revised category from existing ones, as familiarity with the original cate-
gory is a leverage in revision. Familiarity reduces resistance since it enables
actors to remain in the comfort zone of existing categories (Hofstadter 1985).
This is critical whether the revised category replaces its predecessor (e.g., the
Mauritius elite renovating the private school sector in response to mass access
to public schools) or the revised category becomes a variation of its predecessor
(e.g., “war stress” as amasculinized version of “stress” asmale veterans react to
greater female access to the PTSD label).SPECIAL EDUCATION AS A SETTING FOR CATEGORICAL
MANIPULATION
Schools are organizations inwhich individuals are subject to some of the ear-
liest categorizations in life, with lasting consequences. We address manip-
ulation of mild disability categories. Such a category involves two parts: a
label for disability type and an instructional placement option denoting se-
verity. Mental retardation (MR), emotional disturbance (ED), and learning
disability (LD) have been the most common labels and are the focus of our
study.7 LD is the least debilitating and the least stigmatizing label, as it de-
notes limited cognitive processing difficulties (often in reading ormath),while
MR and ED indicate significant and more stigmatizing intellectual and be-7 We use the label MR to mean “mild mental retardation,”which is increasingly referred
to as intellectual disability (ID).
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Allhavioral problems (Sleeter 1986). Within a given label, the least severe cases
are placed in regular classrooms, enjoying maximum access to the full curric-
ulumwith help from paraprofessionals (and in some cases, coteachers). Mod-
erate cases have decreased access to the full curriculum, as they spend part
of the day in resource rooms for remedial instruction from special education
teachers. The most severe cases spend the entire day in self-contained class-
rooms receiving instruction in reduced curricula from special education teach-
ers. The hierarchy of categories is affected both by degree of stigma related
to labeling and scope of curricular coverage related to placement. Pairings of
MR, ED, and LD with three placement options result in a hierarchy of nine
customary categories. But since LD denotes a less significant disability, LD
students have been more likely to be placed in regular classrooms than MR
or ED students who usually are placed inmore restrictive settings (Donovan
and Cross 2002).
What is more important, as seen in figure 1, this hierarchy has been ra-
cialized formuch of the last 50 years.White students traditionally have been
overrepresented in the high-status LD1 category (“LD in regular classroom”),
while blacks have been overrepresented in ED2/3 andMR2/3. Limited cases
of blacks being labeled LD typically involved the low-status LD3 category,
without access to the full curriculum, historically a seldom-used placement
option for LD (Artiles et al. 2010). Conversely, limited instances of whites be-c
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FIG. 1.—Stylized depiction of major categories and racial patterns in mild disability
ategorization. Sizes of the ellipses reflect the representation of racial groups in categories
roportional to their share in the general population. MR 5 mental retardation; ED 5
motional disturbance; LD5 learning disability; ADHD5 attention deficit/hyperactivity
isorder; AU 5 high-functioning autism.198
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Categorization by Organizationsing labeled MR or ED often involved diagnosis with low severity and less
separation from the regular classroom, a lesser used setting for MR and ED
(Skiba et al. 2008).8 Also, as depicted by unshaded pieces of the oval in figure 1,
while black access to the LD label is rising, this is occurring largely in the
form of LD2/3 categorization, not LD1 (Skiba et al. 2006). As whites migrate
to autism (AU) and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), these ap-
pear to be replacing LD as new labels that are more likely to be paired with
regular classroom placement. This, as Ong-Dean (2009) notes, may be forging
new high-status categories less attainable by blacks, who have limited access
to the full curriculum given their continuing overrepresentation inMR2/3 and
ED2/3 and their rising presence inLD2/3.As recent trends unfold,much of the
scholarly debate on racialization remains focused on the nine customary cat-
egories in figure 1 (see Waitoller, Artiles, and Cheney 2010). The district and
the period we analyze, described below, provide a unique opportunity for ex-
amining the nine customary categories.
Critical perspectives emphasize the role of schools in perpetuating racial-
ization in threeways. First is homosocial reproduction inwhich prejudices of
white middle-class educators affect categorization decisions by Individual-
ized Education Program (IEP) teams (Blanchett 2006). Second, similar prej-
udices may be internalized by experts such as school psychologists on IEP
teams (Mehan, Hertweck, and Meihls 1986). Assessment instruments (e.g.,
IQ and achievement tests, behavioral rating scales) are also criticized for bias
(see Waitoller et al. 2010). And third, disability categorization is open to pa-
rental influence, wherein predominantly white affluent parents advocate for
high-status categories in IEP meetings (Trainor 2010). The issue of discrim-
ination in special education has fueled pressure on schools, including move-
ments and federal legislation (Osgood 2008). Lack of change is seen by critics
as a sign of resistance by schools (e.g., Skrtic 1991;Ong-Dean 2009). But these
accounts have not addressed categorical manipulation. This is a significant
gap because the mild disability categorization is a highly malleable domain
in which categories can be reranked in response to pressure for equality.
Viability of reaffiliation.—Categorization rules lack uniformity despite
codification. This stems partly from the variety of cognitive, behavioral, and
academic assessments. Different instruments assessing the same trait may em-
phasize different elements of the trait (e.g., different behaviors for the same
emotional tendency) or employ different rubrics (e.g., different cut scores on8 Research onmild disabilities traces origins of racialization to the role that theories of black
cognitive and cultural inferiority played in the construction ofMRandEDand the practice
of segregating blacks and limiting their access to the full curriculum (Mercer 1973; Lazerson
1983). LD’s emergence, by contrast, is traced to the white middle-class desire in the 1960s
for a label that provided support (e.g., paraprofessionals) for low-performing whites in reg-
ular classrooms, without the stigma ofMRandED (Carrier 1986), a desire triggered by ris-
ing achievement standards as a result of the space race (Sleeter 1986).This restrictedblacks’
access to LD, limiting them primarily to the low-status LD3 category.
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Alltests), resulting in inconsistency in how a disability and its severity are eval-
uated (Reschly 1996). The procedures also can vary, even for the same as-
sessment (e.g., accommodations for a test or consecutive chances to take the
test may be provided in one situation but not in another; Thurlow et al.
2005). Moreover, interpretation of assessment outcomes is affected by subjec-
tive judgments of teachers, school psychologists, administrators, andparents
on IEP teams who view outcomes in light of informal opinions (Harry and
Klingner 2006). Different elements of the outcomesmay receive different em-
phasis, and students with similar outcomes can be viewed differently if neg-
ative impressions are invoked for some and positive impressions for others
(O’Reilly, Northcraft, and Sabers 1989). This can skew categorization for
different students and for the same student over time. It is also whymild dis-
abilities are referred to as “judgmental” disabilities, distinct from biological
ones (e.g., visual impairment; Skiba et al. 2008). Relatedly, symptoms ofmild
disability categories (emotional states, cognitive aptitude) can lack direct ob-
servability and limit precision in categorization. Inability to directly observe
symptoms and their severity results in unverified categorizations (Ysseldyke
et al. 1983; Hosp and Reschly 2003) underlying inadvertent errors (Ysseldyke,
Algozzine, and Thurlow 2000) and discrimination (Harry et al. 2002). Also,
the categories overlap. Disruptive behavior, low achievement, and distract-
ibility are viewed as signs of MR, ED, and LD since they are common to all
three (Hallahan and Kauffman 1977). Finally, since distributions of assess-
ment scores for low, medium, and high severity intersect (Kauffman and
Lloyd 2017), and since subjective judgment affects how scores are viewed,
studentswith similar severitymay be categorized differently, and a student’s
categorization can be changed over time. These factors provide opportuni-
ties for changes in group affiliations with different categories.
Viability of revision.—Mild disability categories are also open to revision.
As noted earlier, given its flexible definition, AU has been revalued by add-
ing positive features to it like creativity and high intellect, which has helped
elevate it over LD (Ong-Dean 2009). Relatedly, certain attributes ofMR that
overlap with AU are reinterpreted by affluent families more positively than
before, whichmay improveMR’s reputation (Eyal 2013). Bearman andKing
(2009) note that if racially nuanced biases againstMR prove too engrained to
transcend,MRmaybe recast as a disorder on the low end of theAUspectrum
by diagnostic accretion and substitution. Another recent case of reinterpreta-
tion involves certain attributes of obsessive compulsive disorder such as te-
nacity and resilience. These are seen as valuation relevant, improving obses-
sive compulsive disorder’s reputation, as they are critical entrepreneurial skills
that a growing number of schools emphasize (Zhao 2012). As for placement
options, while resource rooms and self-contained classrooms are less desirable
than regular classrooms because of limited access to the full curriculum, there
is little that is intrinsically inferior about such segregated spaces, as they are200
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Categorization by Organizationsvalued in the context of other arrangements such as gifted programs (Roger
1993) or advanced placement tracks (Oakes 2005). It is thus plausible to equip
resource rooms and self-contained classrooms with greater paraprofessional
support to help special education teachers extend the scope of curricular cov-
eragewithin these spaces, particularly in elementary andmiddle school, where
curricular topics are not as advanced as in high school (see Kauffman, Bantz,
and McCullough 2002; Mock and Kauffman 2005). In relation to such an al-
teration, other attributes of segregated spaces can be reinterpreted as benefi-
cial, such as the absence of peers as potential sources of distraction, disruption,
and competing demands on the teacher (Kauffman andHallahan 1995). Revi-
sion of labels and instructional placement options can accompany group
reaffiliations in reranking categories.EXAMINING CATEGORICAL MANIPULATION
A Contentious Movement for Equality
Our analysis focuses on a racial desegregation movement in the 1970s in an
urban district serving about 100,000 students at the time. We refer to it as
Midcity School District (MSD), which integrated its schools in the 1970s
and resegregated them in the 1990s. Contention originated in the 1960swhen
turmoil occurred in the city over race relations. Local Civil Rights groups
suedMSD for discrimination but lost the legal battle and settled for promises
of better resources for blacks. As inequities persisted, activists reasserted de-
mands in the early 1970s.WhenMSD refused, activists joined forceswith the
National Association for Advancement of Colored People, suing MSD and
demanding all out integration. Racial divisions became manifest with town
hall meetings, demonstrations, and violence. MSD was found guilty of dis-
crimination. The remedial order, issued a few years later, had a jolting effect,
forcing rapid reversals in entrenched discriminatory practices. It included
busing of up to 45% of students, racial integration of teachers, funding equity
across buildings, and curricular initiatives to narrow achievement gaps.Most
importantly for our analysis, because of concurrent pressure from advocates
of equity in special education, the remedial order addressed mild disability
categorization. Desegregation was seen as a means to address racialization
of customary categories in figure 1. As in many other districts, the majority of
blacks identified as mildly disabled in MSD had been categorized as MR2/3
or ED2/3. A smaller share, labeled LD, were categorized as LD3 without
access to the full curriculum. The court demanded reduction in possible bias
and improvement in representation of blacks in LD1, which had a negligible
number of blacks.
Unlike in regular education in which the court specified racial percentage
ranges for school buildings, similar ranges could not be dictated for mild dis-201
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are not prespecifiable for students. The court could go only as far as requir-
ing a “notable increase” in the proportion of blacks in LD1. While it was
untenable to prespecify racial percentages for mild disability categories, it
also was untenable for one category to be nearly all white in a biracial dis-
trict of 100,000 students, even though the exact scope of ideal change had
to be left open. Inspection of racial patterns in LD1 was included in deseg-
regation monitoring. Legal oversight, normative pressure from local equity
advocates and black leaders, and heightened expectations in the broader
African-American community limited chances for evasion by means of to-
kenism and other forms of symbolic compliance. But mild disability catego-
ries were open to manipulation.Constraints on Upward Movement in Categorization
Categoricalmanipulationwas a viable possibility also because of constraints
on positing newdisability categories to whichwhites couldmigrate. In terms
of labels, disability types are field-level designations professionally elabo-
rated and legitimated over long periods, mitigating against new creations
(Richardson 1999). Labels also have legal underpinnings, as they are subject
to regulation and are aligned with various certification requirements in ed-
ucation. Thus, new label construction is tied to slow-paced changes in field-
level knowledge, conventions, and regulation, which prohibit ad hoc inno-
vations. As for instructional placement options, the regular classroom, the
resource room, and the self-contained classroom exhaust basic possibilities.
The underlying notions of disability severity may be recalibrated to redis-
tribute students across existing placement options. Or the options may be
modified in variousways, as addressed above. But a student’s disabilitywill
have to be diagnosed as either least severe, moderately severe, or highly se-
vere, implying the regular classroom, resource room, or self-contained class-
room. These constraints limited the chances for whites in MSD to move up
to a new category in response to greater black access to LD1, making cate-
gorical manipulation a plausible option to perpetuate inequality.Data Sources
Student records.—The court oversaw MSD’s student information system
starting two years before desegregation. The records contain detailed infor-
mation, including disability category, for about 305,000 first through twelfth
grade white and black students for two decades.9 Before desegregation, en-Latinos and Asians are excluded from the study. The proportion of Latinos in MSD in-9creased from less than 3% to about 6% in the time frame of the study. Asians comprised
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Categorization by Organizationsrollment was about 100,000 (37% white), which declined to about 71,000
(21% white) by the time resegregation started. There are nearly 1.5 million
yearly student records starting two years before desegregation and ending
20 years later with MSD’s “unitary” (legally nondiscriminating) status.
About 145,000 yearly records are for special education students (10%–
15% of yearly enrollment). As seen in table 1, the disability indicator is com-
posed of the nine customary mild disability categories in figure 1 and three
other categories indicating combinations of any biological disability and
three placement options. Family structure and poverty status are social
class controls potentially related to disability. To account for community
conditions (another class control), we geocoded yearly residential addresses,
determined census tracts, and incorporated yearly crime and vital life sta-
tistics for the tracts obtained from a local research center. These statistics
address neighborhood instability (Jargowsky 1997). Measures for achieve-
ment include grade point average (GPA) and national percentile ranks for
math and reading scores on theComprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS).
Student records included a yearly code specifying whether the student was
newly enrolled, continuing in MSD, withdrew from MSD, dropped out, or
graduated. We developed school racial composition measures based on stu-
dent assignments to buildings.
Resource data.—To examine resource allocation, we address per pupil
“excess cost” for categories dominated bywhites. Excess cost is the difference
of the cost of educating a student in a category from the cost of educating a
nondisabled student (Chambers, Kidron, and Spain 2004). It reflects expen-
ditures for staff and services. Excess cost data were provided by MSD offi-
cials. These data help examine whether any categorical changes for whites
were accompanied by reallocation of funds for improvements.
Qualitative data.—We conducted 102 interviews, 88 of which were com-
pleted in a three-year window after MSD was declared unitary. The rest,
including follow-ups with respondents in the original group of 88, were con-
ducted in later years. Interviewees included 50 parents (28 white, 22 black),
23 teachers (13white, 10 black), 2 school psychologists (bothwhite), the pres-
ident of MSD’s Learning Disabilities Association (LDA; white), 4 senior
district leaders (3 white, 1 black), 16 midlevel administrators (11 white,
5 black), and 6 Civil Rights figures (all black).10 Parents were recruited by
stratified random sampling based on educational program (regular vs. spe-
cial education, including disability category), race, and time at MSD (early,an even smaller share of enrollment. MSD’s desegregation was directed specifically at al-
leviating inequities for African-Americans.
10 Senior leaders included two ex-superintendents and two ex-boardmembers. Ten of the
midlevel administrators were school principals in various years in MSD; the remaining
six held various positions at the central district office. And, Civil Rights leaders included
three attorneys involved in the court case and three locally prominent activists.
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middle, late years of desegregation). Eighteen white and eight black parents
had children labeledLD invarious years.All other intervieweeswere selected
on the basis of social or institutional position and time spent in MSD. Inter-
views were about 50 minutes, focusing on respondents’ own experiences and
their accounts of others’ experiences. We also searched for stakeholder state-TABLE 1
Description of Data Used for Quantitative Analysis
Description
tudent information:
Race. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 black (0 5 white; Hispanic, Asian, and other
groups are excluded)
Gender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 male
Poverty status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRLN)
Disability category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nine customarymild disability categories as seen in
fig. 1 and any biological disability coupled with
one of three placement options, resulting in a
total of 12 categories
Family structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 single-parent household
Residential address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geocodable street address and ZIP code
Grade level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grade 1–12 (kindergartners were excluded from
desegregation)
Test scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nationally norm-referenced percentile rank for
grade 1–12 math and reading scores on Com-
prehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) admin-
istered by MSD each fall (A percentile rank in-
dicates the percentage of students whose scores
are lower. MSD was instructed to start testing
soon after it was found guilty of racial discrimi-
nation, but this was before the actual desegre-
gation policy, which was not implemented until
after the remedial order was issued.)
GPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grade point average: .00–4.00
Yearly transaction code . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 newly enrolled; 2 5 remained enrolled; 3 5
withdrew (transferred to another district in or
out of state or to a private school in or out of
state); 4 5 dropped out; 5 5 graduated
eighborhood instability:
Mean crime and vital life statistics
for the student’s residential census
tract
Grand average of tract population percentages for
(1) victims of auto theft, rape, robbery, and as-
sault; (2) residents involved in drug violations
(possession and sale); (3) crime-related deaths
(e.g., homicide); (4) residents receiving welfare
assistance or food stamps; and (5) low weight
births and very low birth weights
chool measure:
Racial composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage black and percentage white based on
student assignments to school buildings specified
in individual records204
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Categorization by Organizationsments in periodic desegregation implementation reports and in the leading
local newspaper (citations are not provided to protect district anonymity).11
We use qualitative data to complement and, when possible, contextualize in-
sights from quantitative data.FINDINGS
To protect district anonymity, we conceal the actual year of initial desegre-
gation and specify it here as 1975. Since student records start two years be-
fore desegregation, 1973–75 is presented as the segregation period, 1975–90
as the desegregation period, and 1990–95 as the resegregation period.Compliance with the Court Order
What were categorization patterns for blacks?
Figure 2A shows the share of LD1 among blacks (dashed line). In 1973, only
0.8% were LD1, about 496 of 62,000 at the time (see parenthetical content
below 1973). In 1978, the share of LD1 among blacks doubled to 1.6%, and
it doubled again to 3.5% by 1981. In the same period, the share of LD3
among blacks declined from 1.5% to 0.4% (solid line). LD2 share also de-
clined, from 1% to 0.3% (dotted line). Importantly, as seen in figure 2B,
the percentage of blacks labeled ED or MR decreased from 1973 to 1981,
driven by a decline in black MRs/EDs in resource rooms (dotted line).
In 1981, the total proportion of blackMRs andEDs, for all placements com-
bined, was 3.5%, less than the total proportion of blacks labeled LD (4.2%).
Thus, compliance with the court order was not tokenistic, although it is dif-
ficult to know whether it needed to be higher. In resegregation, LD1 share
among blacks dropped to 0.9% by 1993, resembling its pre-desegregation
level. This was coupled with a rising share of LD3 among blacks and an in-
crease in black MRs/EDs in resource rooms.Categorical Reaffiliation
Was there downward movement by whites to a low-status category?
Compliance did not mean equality. Figures 2C and 2D show categorical pat-
terns for whites. In 1973, 3.8% of whites were LD1, 1.1% were LD2, and11 Copies of implementation reports were obtained from attorneys involved inMSD’s de-
segregation. Searchable newspaper content was available at the local public library,
which published a news index for reports and editorials in multiple local newspapers.
Date, page, and section information in the index enabled us to obtain newspaper content
from microfilm for early years of desegregation and from the LexisNexis digital news ar-
chive for later years.
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All0.1% (about 35 of them) were LD3. As blacks made inroads to LD1, white
predominance shifted from LD1 to LD3, a customarily low-status, majority-
black category that ordinarily does not provide access to the full curriculum.
In 1978, 4.3% of whites were LD3, compared to 2% in LD1 and 0.4% in
LD2. By 1981, the share of LD3 among whites peaked at 4.6%. White
reaffiliation with LD3 reversed with resegregation in 1990, as whites mi-
grated back to LD1 (fig. 2C). Categorical assignments appear to have been
restored to pre-desegregation patterns when pressure for equality ended, a
likely indication that manipulation did occur during desegregation.Was white migration out of LD1 and back during policy shifts related
to migration in and out of MSD?
It is possible for category percentages for groups to change because of
changes in district composition. A large number of poorer whites (implying
a higher risk of LD3) may have enrolled in MSD in the early years of deseg-
regation or less poor ones may have left in the same period, or both, resulting
in an increase of white share in LD3 and decrease in LD1. And the reverse
may have happened in the transition to resegregation. It is thus important
to examine whether changes in white categorization involved students al-
ready in MSD.
This is addressed in table 2. For the transition from segregation to deseg-
regation, the table shows what percentage of white LD1s in a given year
(rows) remained in LD1 in subsequent years or switched to LD2 or LD3
(columns). For the transition from desegregation to resegregation, the table
shows the percentage ofwhite LD3s in a given yearwho remained in LD3 in
subsequent years and the percentage who switched to LD1 or LD2. For ex-
ample, although 82% of white LD1s in 1974 remained in LD1 in 1975 (the
first year of desegregation), 60% of them migrated to LD3 in 1976. Most re-
mained in LD3 in 1977 because 51% of white LD3s in 1977 were those who
were LD1 in 1974. In the next row, a similar migration is observed, as 66%
of white LD1s in 1975 migrated to LD3 in 1976 and 53% of them remained
there in 1977. Much of the direct migration from LD1 to LD3 stopped by
1977, as 84% of white LD1s in 1976 remained in LD1 in 1977. But this
84% pertains to a reduced share of all whites in MSD because, in 1977, only
about 2% of whites were left in LD1, a percentage that persisted in 1978 and
through the 1980s (see fig. 2C).
As for resegregation, among white LD3s in 1989 (the year before resegre-
gation), 79% migrated back to LD1 in 1990. Most remained LD1 in 1991
(72%) and 1992 (65%). The back migration slowed by 1991, as many white
LD3s from 1990 remained LD3 in 1991 (83%) and 1992 (74%). Here again,
these large percentages pertain to a reduced share of whites since, as seen in
figure 2C, only 0.8% of all whites were LD3 by 1990 (see the same percent-206
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Categorization by Organizationsage for 1993). This indicates that white migration out of LD1 and back dur-
ing policy shifts was not strongly related towhitemigration in and out of the
district during those shifts. It involved primarily the reassignment of whites
already in MSD. The administrative logistics of these reassignments are
important to consider. For instance, the 60% of white LD1s in 1974 who
switched to LD3 by 1976 involved 674 students or 0.07% of total MSD en-FIG. 2.—Racial percentages for mild disability categories for selected years. Rounded-
up total enrollment numbers for black and white students are in parentheses below the
years. Actual years are hidden to protect MSD’s anonymity. A, blacks, LD; B, blacks,
MR 1 ED; C, whites, LD; D, whites, MR 1 ED.207
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Allrollment.12 Likewise, the 79% of white LD3s who switched to LD1 from
1989 to 1990 involved 521 students, 0.08%of total enrollment.13ReassigningThere were about 34,000 whites in MSD in 1974, 3.3% of whom, or 1,122, were LD1.
ince, as seen in table 2, 60% of these migrated to LD3 by 1976, the migration involved
74 whites (1,122  0:60). Given the total enrollment of 89,000 for 1976 (28,000 whites
nd 61,000 blacks), the 674 whites comprised 0.07% of MSD (674/89,000).
There were about 15,000 whites in MSD in 1989, 4.4% of whom, or 660, were LD3.12
S
6
a
13FIG. 2.—(Continued)Since, as seen in table 2, 79% of these migrated to LD1 by 1990, the migration involved
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Categorization by Organizationssuch small shares of students was not only administratively feasible but
achievable under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Did white presence in LD3 vary by grade level?
LD3 implies instruction in a reduced curriculum by a special education
teacher in a self-contained classroom for the entire day. Thus, migration
to LD3 can be detrimental unless instruction is modified to replicate the full
curriculum. We present evidence on such modification below in relation to
categorical revision. Here, given our focus on reaffiliation, we address
whether migration to LD3was affected by the need for curricular modifica-
tion to LD3. It is feasible to cover the full curriculum in self-contained class-
rooms in elementary andmiddle school, but not in high school, whichwould
reduce whites’ interest in LD3 in high school. Constraints on modification
stem from the rising complexity of topics across grade levels. Special educa-
tion teachers in self-contained classrooms typically can switch from reduced
to full curricula in elementary and middle school with greater paraprofes-
sional support, since topics are not as advanced as in high school (e.g., a sev-TABLE 2
Migration Patterns for White LD Students during Policy Shifts
LD1 LD2 LD3 LD1 LD2 LD3 LD1 LD2 LD3
1975* 1976 1977
From segregation
to desegregation:
LD1:
1974 . . . . . . . . . . . .82 .06 .04 .24 .02 .60 .21 .02 .51
1975 . . . . . . . . . . . .23 .01 .66 .21 .01 .53
1976 . . . . . . . . . . . .84 .04 .06
1990y 1991 1992
From desegregation
to resegregation:
LD3:
1989 . . . . . . . . . . . .79 .02 .11 .72 .03 .11 .65 .02 .09
1990 . . . . . . . . . . . .07 .02 .83 .03 .02 .74
1991 . . . . . . . . . . . .06 .01 .85521 whites (660  0:79). G
50,000 blacks), the 521 w
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urnals.uNOTE.—All numbers are percentages based on cross-tabulation of raw counts from individ-
ual student records. Critical percentages are shownwith frames around them. Rowpercentages
for LD1, LD2, and LD3 rowwithin panels do not add up to one because of attrition (e.g., with-
drawals from MSD and graduations).
* First year of desegregation.
y First year of resegregation.and
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Allenth grade special education teacher who covers math topics like balanced
equations can extend instruction to include proportions and probability
covered in regular classrooms; Montague and Jitendra 2006).14 Such exten-
sions are less likely in high school, as topics require significant specialization
(e.g., high school special education teachers are qualified in a narrow range
of topics in math relative to the scope of algebra or calculus taught in regular
classrooms, regardless of the extent of paraprofessional support).15 And since
assigning regular classroom teachers to self-contained classrooms is imper-
missible, it is problematic to deliver the full curriculum in such classrooms
in high school. This places an inherent limit on malleability in reranking
LD1 and LD3 categories, an issue stressed by multiple interviewees in our
sample. One of them addressed it from a uniquely relevant vantage point.
She was a member of the local LDA in early years of desegregation, and
later became its president. LDA is an organization that, aswe explain below,
played a pivotal role in coordination of parental efforts for white migration
to LD3. In her account: “[White LD] parentswere getting their kids into spe-
cial ed [self-contained] classrooms. . . . But it wasn’t going to happen past
seventh or eighth grade [because] instruction wouldn’t be the same . . .
you just can’t cover the material the same way no matter what. . . . Many
[white] kids went back to the [regular] classroom after middle school. Some
parents left [MSD]when their child reached high school. Some used the time
[when their child was] in middle school to look for places to move in other
districts.”
Figure 3 shows grade distributions in LD3 and LD1 by race (overall cat-
egorypercentages in racial groups and related rawnumbers arebelowyears).
As seen in figure 3A, during desegregation (1978–87), when LD3 was white
dominated, only about 7% of white LD3s were in high school. In the same
years, figure 3B shows that 86% or more of white LD1s were in high school.
Importantly, black LD1s (fig. 3D)weremore evenly distributed across grade
level than whites in desegregation years, indicating that the LD1 category
was racially shared in high school. A separate analysis showed that, in any
given year between 1977 and 1990, over 90% of white LD3s in eighth grade
switched toLD1 inninthgrade.Thus, limits onmalleability—in this case, the
difficulty ofmodifying the LD3 category at the high school level—resulted in
a more balanced racial presence in LD1 in high school. As for black LD3s
(fig. 3C), they, like black LD1s, were rather evenly distributed across gradeSee also Brownell, Hirsch, and Seo (2004) on certification requirements for special ed-
cation teachers involving awide range of expertise across elementary andmiddle school
rades.
Examples of other curricular topics in high school that are subject to markedly nar-
ower coverage in self-contained classrooms than in regular classrooms include science,
nglish language arts, economics, business, and technology (see Wehman and Kregel
003).14
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FIG. 3.—Grade distributions in LD3 and LD1 by race in selected years. Category per-
centages for each group (based on fig. 2) are in parentheses below years, and correspond-
ing raw numbers are in brackets below the percentages. Actual years are hidden to pro-
tect MSD’s anonymity. A, White LD3s; B, white LD1s; C, black LD3s; D, black LD1s.All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Alllevels despite limited presence in LD3 in desegregation years (e.g., as little
as 0.3% of blacks, or 144 blacks, in LD3 in 1984). Pre-desegregation grade
distributions in categories were largely restored in resegregation when, per-
centages of disability categories within racial groups resembled patterns in
pre-desegregation years—in particular, in figures 3B, 3C, and 3D compare
the column for 1973 to those for 1990 and 1993.
Was white migration related to school capacity?
Issues of school capacity must be considered in relation to white migration.
The question is whether racially sharing LD1 would have created too many
LD1s for elementary andmiddle schools. The solid line in figure 4 shows the
number of white LD1s over time (based on fig. 3B). The dashed line repre-
sents what the number would have been had the pre-desegregation LD1
share amongwhites persisted in desegregation. In 1973, 3.8% ofwhites were
LD1 (see fig. 2C). We multiplied this by the total number of whites in later
years to estimate the dashed line in figure 4. In 1978, had 3.8% ofwhites been
LD1, there would have been 798 white LD1s. The differences between ac-
tual and projected numbers in desegregation years are in between the two
lines. Since whites abandoned LD1 in elementary and middle school, the
actual and projected differences pertain primarily to those grades. Thus,
we divided each difference by the number of elementary andmiddle schools
in the correspondingyear (see columns). Since desegregationweakenedneigh-
borhood assignment zones, the 378 additionalwhiteLD1s in 1978wouldhave
been spread across 113 elementary and middle schools, resulting in 3.35 ad-
ditionalwhite LD1s per building. Thiswould have been 3.27 in 1981, 2.94 in
1984, and 2.37 in 1987, averaging to 2.77, or about 3 students per building.
Assuming, conservatively, that there were at least 10 classrooms per school,FIG. 3.—(Continued)212
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Allthere would have been about 0.30 more white LD1s per classroom. This
low number suggests that white migration out of LD1 was unrelated to
school capacity.16Was categorization related to individual traits other than race?
Social class factors such as poverty, family structure, and neighborhood in-
stability increase the risk of stigmatizing disability labels and greater sever-
ity within any given label (Tomlinson 2014). We tested the extent to which
such factors reduced racial differences in categorization by means of a mul-
tinomial logistic model for selected years. We fit the model first for elemen-
tary and middle school and then for high school:1716 As in other districts, the post-desegregation enrollment decline in MSD was driven
primarily by the exit of the relatively affluent families from white neighborhoods. Since
poorer students have a higher risk of mild disability, it is conceivable that the LD1
percentage for whites in desegregation years may have been greater than 3.8 (the pre-
desegregation percentage) had whites not migrated to LD3. This implies an upward ad-
justment to our per building estimate of additional white LD1s. If we were to make the
extreme assumption that thewhite LD1 percentage could have been 50%greater than 3.8
in desegregation years—that is, 5.7%—our per building estimate becomes approximately
six rather than three additional students, and our per classroomestimate becomes 0.60 rather
than 0.30,which is still marginally small as it is well below one student.We also examined
the effect of school racial composition on white migration to LD3. Since migration was
triggered by desegregation, we tested whether elementary and middle schools with
greater percentages of blacks had more whites in the LD3 category. The court required
the percentage of blacks in any school to bewithin a 20-percentage-point range of the pro-
portion of blacks in the district. Thus, despite racial mixing, there was considerable var-
iation in school racial composition, especially asMSD became less white over time. How-
ever, our regression analysis (involving a longitudinal fixed-effects model relying on
school-level panel data) showed that the percentage of blacks in an elementary or middle
school building had little effect on the percentage of white LD3s in the building. This is a
sensible pattern given students’ risk of multiple school reassignments over time for racial
mixing (especially white students whose numbers declined) and the related problem for
whites to switch back and forth between LD3 and LD1 depending on changes in building
racial composition. For many whites, building racial composition may have changed at
various times, even if they themselves were not reassigned but rather others in the build-
ing were reassigned because of MSD’s racial-mixing policy in the context of broader de-
mographic changes during desegregation. Additionally, as we show later, a formalmeans
of white LD3 categorization involved test score deflation (to misrepresent the severity of
learning problems), followed by a test score recovery once the student was in LD3, as a
result of “appropriate services” in that category. Such a strategy is more feasible to em-
ploy once rather than multiple times. Thus, whites in elementary and middle school ap-
pear to have abandoned the LD1 category as a whole irrespective of school racial com-
position and reclaimed the category once the desegregation regime ended.
17 A combined run required a complex layer of interactions with a dummy for high school
level. Given the interactions already in themodel, an additional layer of interaction terms
created significant computational complexity. In addition, while the run for high school
level included all students in high school, the run for elementary/middle school level re-
lied on a 50% stratified random sample to facilitate convergence within tolerance limits.
214
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Pijt
PiJt
 
5 aj 1 bjYi 1 gjBi 1 djðYi  BiÞ 1 vjSTit 1 ljSCit
1 yjðYi  SCitÞ 1 εit,
where i 5 student and t 5 year. Outcome categories are denoted by j 5
1, . . . , J, where J 5 13. Nondisabled is the baseline. Nine of the remain-
ing outcomes are customary mild disability categories in figure 1. The next
three are for any biological disability paired with any placement option.
Year is denoted by Y;B is a dummy for black, interacting with year; ST rep-
resents poverty, family structure, and neighborhood instability, as well as
math achievement, GPA, grade level, and gender; and SC represents school
dummies interacting with year, picking up school effects such as culture, lo-
cation, and racial composition.18
Figures 5 and 6 show black/white odds ratios for mild disabilities (all log-
odds estimates are in tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). Covariate adjust-
ment does not alter patterns in categorization. Results for elementary and
middle school are in figure 5. As seen in figure 5A, blacks were about
75% less likely than whites to be LD1 in 1973 (odds ratio 5 0:25; e21.38 in
table A1) and in 1974 (odds ratio 5 0:25; e21.38–0.01 in table A1). In each of
these years, blacks were nearly 20 times more likely to be LD3 (fig. 5C).
But by 1978, they were 4.41 times more likely to be LD1 and about 88% less
likely to be LD3. In 1981, they were 7.23 times more likely to be LD1 and
about 90% less likely to be LD3. This reversal persisted through desegre-
gation, but previous patterns reemerged with resegregation in 1990. As
for high school, figure 6 shows that, although blacks in high school had sig-
nificantly limited access to LD1 in 1973 and 1974, by 1978 they were only
about 10% less likely than whites to be LD1 (odds ratio 5 0:90). Consistent
with univariate findings, while LD1 was largely black in elementary and
middle school, it was racially shared in high school. White persistence in
LD1 in high school tilted the odds of being in LD1 slightly in favor of whites.
This changedwith resegregation in 1990, as blacks in high school lost signif-
icant ground in LD1. Turning to LD3, while the odds of being in that cate-
gory in high school were dramatically greater for blacks before desegrega-
tion, blacks in high school were only slightly more likely to be LD3 in
desegregation years (at its peak, the odds ratio was about 1.11). This modestSubsampling preserved original yearly percentages by race, poverty, gender, family struc-
ture, school building, residential census tract, and educational category, which included
mild disability categories, biological disability categories, and nondisability. We used the
PROC CATMOD procedure in SAS 9.4 for estimation. Model diagnostics included tests
for quasi-complete separation, influential cases, and collinearity.
18 We also fit several other models, each of which included interactions of a given student
measures (e.g., poverty) with year and race to account for how its effect varied by period
or group, but key insights from these models are similar to those presented here.
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Alldifference reflects the similarly low presence of blacks and whites in LD3 in
high school in desegregation. As noted earlier, black presence in LD3 de-
clined across all grade levels, while white presence in it was limited specif-
ically in high school.
Importantly, figures 5 and 6 suggest that desegregation also affected ra-
cial patterns in ED2. In each figure, the decline in the black/white odds ratio
for ED2 in desegregation years is strong and statistically significant; the ra-
tio returns to it pre-desegregation levels in resegregation years (see U-
shaped pattern in panel E). As for MR, no categories within that label were
affected by desegregation (panels G, H, and I). This suggests that the U-
shaped dotted line in figure 2B (resource room for black MRs/EDs) reflectsFIG. 5.—Estimates of black/white odds ratios for mild disability categories for elemen-
tary andmiddle school grades in selected years. Results are based on a 50% stratified ran-
dom sample (see n. 17). Ratios significant at 0.05 level are shaded. See table A1 for full re-
sults. A, LD1 regular classroom; B, LD2 resource room; C, LD3 self-contained classroom;
D, ED1 regular classroom; E, ED2 resource room; F, ED3 self-contained classroom;
G, MR1 regular classroom; H, MR2 resource room; I, MR3 self-contained classroom.216
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Categorization by Organizationschanges in ED2 more than MR2.19 Thus, greater use of LD1 for blacks in
desegregation appears to be coupled specifically with lesser use of LD3
and ED2 (although unlike LD3, ED2 was not a white destination in deseg-
regation). Arguably, black LD1s during desegregation were often those stu-
dents who otherwise were likely to be categorized as having either a severe
learning disability (LD3) or a moderate emotional disturbance (ED2). We
address the implications of this for the learning outcomes of other students
in regular classrooms in the next section, in relation to dynamics of categor-
ical revision.
How were changes in white categorization achieved?
Malleability facilitates reaffiliation. In migration from LD1 to LD3 (and
back), the central enabling factor is the limited observability of LD severity.FIG. 5.—(Continued)19 Univariate trends for MR2 confirm this.
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AllIn contrast, the severity level of a biological disability like visual impair-
ment is directly observable. LD severity is denoted by an IQ-achievement
discrepancy, which is greater when achievement is lower thanwhat IQ sug-
gests. Unlike MR (low IQ), LD signifies achievement problems in the ab-
sence of low IQ. IEP teams can affect IQ-achievement discrepancy in
two ways, given limited uniformity in categorization rules and procedures,
another element of malleability. One approach is to readjust IQ scores. For
instance, the degree to which an IQ test is verbally loaded can inflate or
deflate scores (Jensen 1980). Yet notable changes in IQ are difficult to
achieve and to justify, as IQ is more stable than achievement. Amore viable
option is to readjust achievement. Here, test scores can be influenced by test
difficulty (depth of skills that are evaluated) or by testing conditions (e.g.,
time allowed for the test, whether supports such as test readers are pro-
vided). IQ data were unavailable from MSD, but national percentile ranks
for CTBSmath and reading scores (from each fall) helped examine changesFIG. 5.—(Continued)218
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allin white achievement in relation to migration from LD1 to LD3 and back (a
percentile rank is the percentage of students in the nation whose scores are
lower). For each student, yearly ranks for math and reading scores were
combined into an average rank. In figure 7, we present overall means of
these individual averages for selected years. Our findings indicate substan-
tial test score deflation for white LDs to increase their IQ-achievement
discrepancy.
Each panel in figure 7 has a base year, which is the second year on theX-
axis, marked by arrows on each side (see 1974 in fig. 7A). The arrows convey
our tracking of base year students’ achievement over time, forward for
three years (see 1975, 1976, and 1977 in fig. 7A) and backward for one year
(see 1973 in fig. 7A). The base year data contain white LD students in ele-FIG. 6.—Estimates of black/white odds ratios for mild disability categories for high
school grades in selected years. Ratios significant at 0.05 level are shaded. See table A2
for full results. A, LD1 regular classroom; B, LD2 resource room; C, LD3 self-contained
classroom;D, ED1 regular classroom; E, ED2 resource room; F, ED3 self-contained class-
room; G, MR1 regular classroom; H, MR2 resource room; I, MR3 self-contained class-
room.220
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Categorization by Organizationsmentary and middle school in that year (white migration to LD3 did not ex-
tend to high school). For parsimony, we do not present separate means for
white LD1s, LD2s, and LD3s, since white LDs in elementary and middle
school were largely accumulated in only one of these categories depending
on period—typically in LD1 or LD3, with very few in LD2. The overall
white LD mean primarily reflects the mean of either LD1 or LD3, and
changes in it are driven by changes in whether students were accumulated
in LD1 or LD3. The base year mean is reported separately for new enrollees
and for those who were previously enrolled. For instance, in figure 7A, base
year white LDs who were new enrollees in that year (1974) have a mean
rank of 0.43 (light shading), and those who were continuing in MSD have
a mean rank of 0.47 (dark shading). Separating new from existing students
helps examine if and when dynamics for the two groups were different. To
the right of the base year are the means for base year students in the nextFIG. 6.—(Continued)221
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Allthree years, adjusting for attrition. In figure 7A, base year white LDs who
were enrolled in MSD before 1974 have a 1975 mean of 0.44, 1976 mean
of 0.36, and 1977 mean of 0.44. Paired with these are the corresponding
means for base year white LDs who were new enrollees in 1974: 0.43 in
1975, 0.36 in 1976, and 0.45 in 1977. Although base year observations are
restricted to elementary and middle school, means for subsequent years
draw on high school as well (e.g., in fig. 7A, we follow the percentile rank
of base year eighth graders who finish middle school in 1974 and advance
to ninth grade in 1975, tenth grade in 1976, and eleventh grade in 1977).
This is important, as we track achievement over time. Finally, to the left
of the base year, we show the lagged mean for base year white LDs who
were in MSD a year earlier (0.47 for 1973 in fig. 7A). New enrollees in the
base year do not have a lagged mean. The trend lines show the weighted
average of paired columns except for the lagged column. Number of base
year new enrollees varied between 5% and 7.5% of all base year students.FIG. 6.—(Continued)222
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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AllIn figure 7A, the 1976 achievement decline for base yearwhite LDs is con-
sistent with our finding that a significant proportion of whites who were
LD1 in 1974 migrated to LD3 in 1976 (60% in table 2). The approximately
eight-point dip in mean rank is a sharp deviation from prior achievement,
and the recovery (of about eight points) in 1977 suggests that the dip wasFIG. 7.—Longitudinal patterns ofmeanCTBSpercentile rank for white LDs in selected
years. Means are for math and reading combined. Each panel focuses on a specific (i.e.,
base) year (A, 1974; B, 1975; C, 1976; D, 1977; E, 1978; F, 1982; G, 1986; H, 1990;
I, 1993) and shows (1)means for previously and newly enrolledwhite LDs in the base year,
(2) subsequent yearly means for the same two groups for three years following the base
year, and (3) a lagged mean for the base year white LDs who were at MSD a year earlier.
The trend line represents the weighted average of means for the dark-shaded and light-
shaded columns, except for the first year in each panel (the year before the base year). Base
year new enrollees varied between 5% and 7.5% of all base year white LDs.224
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Categorization by Organizationslikely strategic, to facilitate migration to LD3. Once an LD1 student is
recategorized as LD3 on the basis of declining achievement (greater IQ-
achievement discrepancy), he or she can remain in LD3 despite subsequent
achievement recovery because parents and other IEP team members can
argue that LD3 services are appropriate, as they have stopped and reversed
the decline. This argument may not even be required, as the student need
not be reevaluated until the parent formally requests a reevaluation (Turn-
bull and Turnbull 1998). In MSD, as in other districts, IEP teams typically
reevaluated a student once every three years, but parents could ask for ex-FIG. 7.—(Continued)225
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Allemptions. They also could request a reevaluation at any time if they desired
adjustments to services. Thus, depending on conditions, the parent could
point to improved achievement in LD3 to demand recategorizing the stu-
dent as LD1, since higher test scores could be cast as evidence that the stu-
dent now can be successful in LD1 (in the regular classroom). Importantly,
figure 7A does not reflect the full extent of the score dip related to white
migration to LD3 in 1976 because the 1976 observations for figure 7A in-
clude ninth and tenth grade (high school) achievement for base year stu-
dents who were in the seventh and eighth grades in 1974. IEP teams did
not need to deflate test scores in high school, as white migration to LD3 ex-
cluded high school. The 1976 dip is deeper in figure 7B (base year 1975), asFIG. 7.—(Continued)226
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Categorization by Organizationsthe 1976 observations here include fewer high school students—only those
who were in eighth grade (and not in seventh grade) in the base year. The
full extent of the 1976 dip is seen in figure 7C, where the base year is itself
1976. Here, base year students who are continuing in MSD have a mean
rank of 0.30, which is nearly 16 points below the rank from a year earlier
(0.46 in 1975). And new enrollees in the base year have mean rank of 0.35.
The means for both groups recover to 0.45 in the following year and are
maintained in 1978 and 1979.FIG. 7.—(Continued)227
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AllThe 1976 dip shows up for the last time in figure 7D (base year 1977) as
the lagged achievement for base year students. Figure 7D is also the first
panel where new enrollees in the base year start out with a substantially
lower mean rank than previous enrollees (0.31 vs. 0.43) but catch up in
the following year and remain on parwith other base yearwhite LDs in sub-
sequent years. This pattern persists in figures 7E, 7F, and 7G. It suggests
that, after 1976, IEP teams deflated test scores of only the incoming white
LDs in elementary andmiddle school to facilitate LD3 categorization on ar-
rival. SinceMSDmaintained the same test over time, test score deflation for
white LDs reflects changes in testing conditions—such as less time allowed
for the test or removal of supports like test readers. Parents in MSD could
request the district to provide or not provide such test accommodations. In
1980, the leading local newspaper reported that an evaluation commis-
sioned by the school board suggested that there were “significant problems
with the use of tests and test results in . . . placement into special education
programs for learning disabilities . . . and that race may be a factor.” This
evaluation never resurfaced in the media, which, along with our findings
on white migration to LD3 throughout the 1980s, suggests that the evalua-
tion had no consequence. When category attributes (in this case, severity of
learning disability) are not directly and verifiably observable and when cat-
egorization rules and procedures (in this case, testing conditions) lack uni-
formity, organizations enjoy greater discretion in categorization decisions
and can find it easier to conceal biases. Figures 7H (base year 1990) and
7I (base year 1993) indicate that deflationary practices were discontinued
in resegregation when whites migrated back to LD1. We also examinedFIG. 7.—(Continued)228
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Categorization by Organizationsachievement patterns of blacks, addressing the samebase years as infigure 7.
This analysis focused on students who switched to LD1 from any other cat-
egory as well as students for whomLD1was the only category ever held. No
substantial achievement declines or gains were observed. The mean percen-
tile rank varied longitudinally between 0.40 and 0.44 for any given group of
base year students, for both new enrollees and previous enrollees.What were stakeholder interests and actions related to white
migration to LD3?
The majority of white families opposed desegregation. Few disagreed in
media reports that schools were unequal, but many favored reforms other
than desegregation, such as voluntary school choice programs. They feared
that desegregation could undermine schooling for whites to help blacks. Re-
actions to sharing privileges with blacks were strong among whites with
disabled children in our interview sample. Five were parents of LD1s when
MSD desegregated. They all expressed the urgency they and others felt to
maintain “good educational services,” which, as one mother put it, was
“more important than [racial] separation,” although separation also may
have been a factor. Key advantages of LD1 (less stigma and access to a full
curriculum) were intertwined with its racially exclusionary nature. Ulti-
mately, white efforts tomaintain “quality education” amounted to construc-
tion of yet another predominantly white category, namely, LD3. One of
these parents (one of the fivementioned above) was open about such efforts:
“We had to do something! My son had special needs. We did not want the
quality of education to suffer because of [desegregation]. We did not trust
the district to help us out. . . . Several of our friends left [MSD]. . . . Many
of us worked with teachers and evaluation teams in our schools [IEP teams
in schools in white neighborhoods] to have our kids reassigned to separate
[self-contained] rooms and get better education in there.”
“Working” with IEP teams in schools in white neighborhoods was a vi-
able means of migrating to LD3, as white parents likely found it easier to
influence those IEP teams than teams in schools in other parts of MSD. Ho-
mosocial reproduction to maintain white LD students’ privileges may have
been more likely in schools in white neighborhoods given the greater pres-
ence of white educators and administrators. New categorizations would
follow the students if they were bused away. Four of the six school prin-
cipals in our interview sample who worked in white neighborhoods in the
early years of desegregation commented openly on white migration to
LD3 at the time. As one recalled: “Many [white LD1 parents] . . .were upset
when they realized their kids would be in class with black kids. So many
wanted to get their kids out of those programs . . . even leave the schools alto-229
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Allgether. . . . They thought the quality of education would suffer. . . .Many of
themwanted their kids rediagnosed by their schools [in white neighborhoods].”
However, desire to maintain privilege can be inconsequential unless cou-
pled with resources and efficacy. Thus, parental influence likely involved
not just any parents but those most able to help bring about discriminatory
changes in categorization. We tested this by examining patterns of paren-
tal advantage for white LD1s and LD3s in elementary and middle school.
We used data for family structure, poverty, and neighborhood instability.
These are critical proxies for parental resources, education, and occupational
attainment, which strongly predict parental influence on schools (Duncan
and Murnane 2011). We first created a composite disadvantage measure
for white LD1s and LD3s by averaging each year’s percentages for single-
parent family, poverty status, and neighborhood instability (for each student,
the yearly neighborhood instability percentage is itself an average of per-
centages for five crime and vital life statistics in the student’s residential cen-
sus tract; see table 1). For a given category in a given year, we added the
single-parent-family percentage, the poverty percentage, and the neighbor-
hood instability percentage and divided this by three. Finally, we inverted
our disadvantage measure (1/composite) to covert it to an advantage score.
Patterns of this score for white LD1s and LD3s are in figure 8A.
In 1973, the parental advantage score for white LD1s was 2.41, which
was 1.6 times greater than the score for white LD3s (1.50). By 1978, the sit-
uation reversed, as the score for white LD1s (1.81) was 36% smaller than
that for white LD3s (2.82). The reversal persisted through the 1980s. Thus,
migration to LD3 was related to parental capacity to influence IEP teams,
leaving relatively disadvantaged white LDs in LD1 (those who were more
likely to live in single-parent families, poverty, and unstable neighbor-
hoods). Consistent with prior figures, pre-desegregation patterns were re-
stored with resegregation starting in 1990. Thus, parental influence was also
coupled with migration back to LD1.
At the group level, parental influence can be more effective when coordi-
nated. Parents of many white LDs were mutually aware of their efforts. Be-
yond the neighborhood- and school-based networks (mentioned by inter-
viewees), the local LDA played a key coordination role. Established in the
white part of MSD in the mid-1960s, LDA functioned as a hub for parents
of white LDs and was well connected to the district office and several (typ-
ically white) school psychologists on IEP teams across MSD schools. LDA
had very few nonwhitemembers. Figure 8B shows howLDA’s membership
(dark shading) closely tracked the total white LD enrollment in MSD (light
shading) until the association disbanded in 1989. LDA membership varied
between 71% and 86% of the number of white LDs. LDA was particularly
active in coordinating efforts in the early andmiddle years of desegregation.230
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FIG. 8.—White LD parental advantage in elementary and middle school grades (A), and
total LDA membership compared to total white LD enrollment in selected years (B). Each
score in A is the inverse of a composite disadvantage measure (to denote “advantage”). The
composite disadvantage measure is the mean of the percentages for single-parent family
(%SP), eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch (%FRL), and neighborhood instability
(the instability measure is the average of percentages for five crime and vital life statistics
for the student’s residential census tract; see table 1). For instance, 2.41 for LD1 in 1973 is
calculated as 1=ð%SP 1 %FRL 1 %NÞ=3Þ, where %N is the average of percentages for
the five crime and vital life statistics. For B, white LD enrollment totals are based on per-
centages in figure 2C. LDA membership totals were obtained from the president of the as-
sociation, except for 1984, which was unavailable. We estimated the 1984 total (871) on the
basis of 1981 and 1987 data. LDA memberships in 1981 and 1987 respectively were 88%
and 72% of total white LD enrollment (i.e., 1,087/1,224 in 1981 and 788/1,088 in 1987).
Taking the average of these two proportions, we estimated the 1984 membership to be
80% of white LD enrollment in that year (0:80  1,088). Finally, the LDA membership
for 1990 (674) is from 1989, the year LDA disbanded.All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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AllFrom 1975 to 1979, it held information sessions and operated two hotlines.
Its president from 1979 to 1986, who we quoted above (regarding white
avoidance of LD3 in high school), became an LDA member in 1974 and
was actively involved in parental coordination. She noted:232
 use sAt some point that first year [1975] wewere having largemeetings everymonth.
I’m talking 300–400 people. . . . Parents were freaking out about busing. . . .
Those who had kids in high school weren’t as worried [as their children would
be graduating soon]. Some of them were even pleased about deseg. For the rest
of us, this wasn’t a racial thing.We just didn’t want the instruction to suffer. . . .
[Early meetings] were focused on asking the judge to keep kids with special
needs out of the deseg plan, but the issue then became getting our kids into sep-
arate [self-contained] classrooms and offering full instruction [full curriculum]
in there. The judge didn’t know how distracting it would be to bring kids with
special needs from across town [black students] intomainstream [regular] class-
rooms. This wasn’t a racial thing. . . . The judge simply didn’t think things
through.Shewent on to explain how LDAmeetings became a context of support and
collective effort among members, a forum for developing “solutions,” in-
cluding test score deflation, addressed above.[Our] newsletter addressed questions and concerns. . . . We also regularly in-
vited local principals and [school] psychologists to ourmeetings to answer ques-
tions and inform us on what our members can and cannot do. . . .We knew the
rules. . . .Next spring [of 1976], we were advising parents to ask for their kids to
be tested without special assistance [extra time, separate rooms, test readers] in
the fall test [CTBS]. Some didn’t do it and others hated it, but they were willing
to do it. . . . They could ask for assistance later on [future CTBS occasions]. . . .
Some parents talked to their principals for ways to avoid disruptions in their
kids’ services [including] donat[ing] money for [self-contained] classrooms. . . .
Others talked to special ed teachers for what was needed in [self-contained]
classrooms.Finally, she, like several other interviewees, noted a key motive for MSD
schools to cooperate with white LD parents’ efforts to change categorization
patterns in the context of desegregation. As she put it, “The schools didn’t
mind helping our parents at all . . . they wanted to keep as many white kids
as possible. Theywere losing somany [white] families. The district’s LDpro-
gram was great. Everyone wanted to save it [from desegregation]. . . . Prin-
cipals didn’t like what was going on either. . . . They helped us out well into
the 1980s in both parts of town [white and black neighborhoods]. . . . We
[LDA] informed new parents [of new white LDs] as best we could as they
came into the program.”
Between 1980 and 1989, LDA had five large meetings per year. Its bi-
monthly newsletter included parent questions and related answers, includ-
ing information on district, state, and federal regulations. The newsletter
also included the association’s contact information, meeting schedule, andubject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Categorization by Organizationscurricular information. LDA’s newsletter was mailed to members and was
freely available in schools and the central district office, whichmade it easily
accessible to prospective members and nonmembers.
Apart from the goal of helping curb white exit from the district, MSD
schools may have had a specific financial incentive in keeping white LD
parents from leaving. As the principal of an MSD middle school in the
mid-1980s stressed, “fewer [white LDs] meant fewer special ed dollars.”
One of the two school psychologists in our sample put this in a more elab-
orate context. She worked in MSD from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s
and regularly participated in IEP team meetings. According to her, “[Spe-
cial education programs] always need more money. Ask any principal,
[state funds] for special ed kids are a big deal. The district [special education
unit] knew that, too. No one liked to see [state funds] go. . . .A lot of the state
money went to instruction, but principals had a bit of control over how to
divide it up in the building.” The state funds addressed here are in addition
to the base funds MSD received for each student from local, state, and fed-
eral sources regardless of disability status. Revenues became increasingly
critical, as district enrollment declined and additional fiscal problems
emerged in the 1980s. As noted earlier, organizations may favor dominant
groups in categorization out of self-interest, in addition to effects of homo-
social reproduction and the role of bias and prejudice against subordinate
groups.Categorical Revision
Categorical manipulation may require revisions to technical attributes of
low-status categories. For LD3, this implies alteration in the scope of curric-
ular coverage and reinterpretation of the self-contained classroom as a set-
ting that is more desirable than the regular classroom for disabled students.What did attribute alteration in LD3 involve?
There is nothing about settings separated from the regular classroom that
inherently restricts curricular coverage—as noted earlier, in gifted educa-
tion they are used for covering advanced curricula. Thus, self-contained
classrooms can be construed as places where it is appropriate to cover ma-
terial beyond the reduced curriculum. This introduces a degree of flexibil-
ity in how LD3 is defined and configured, since it is possible to deliver the
full curriculum to LD3s by increasing paraprofessional support in self-
contained classrooms to assist instruction by special education teachers.
Such assistance ordinarily is provided to regular classroom teachers in deliv-
ering the full curriculum to LD1s, but in elementary and middle school,
where topics do not require the same degree of teacher specialization as in233
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Allhigh school, paraprofessionals also can be used in self-contained classrooms.
Yet, without abundant resources to hire more paraprofessionals, this may
result in fewer paraprofessionals in regular classrooms and thus reduced
learning opportunities for LD1s. There is a strong presumption in local
and state special education funding that the full curriculum will be deliv-
ered in regular classrooms and that paraprofessionals are integral to that
process (Parrish, Chambers, andGuarino 1999). Given this strong presump-
tion, there is little that formally limits the extent of paraprofessional reallo-
cation to self-contained classrooms. Thus, considerable reallocation can oc-
cur at the discretion of administrators, namely, building principals and staff
at the central district special education unit. Our interviewees who held
district-level administrative posts in various years in MSD declined to
comment on this issue. As for principals, only two were willing to address
it, but they came to MSD in resegregation years and did not have direct
knowledge of or experience with curricular modification to LD3 during de-
segregation. However, both noted that, in their buildings, veteran special
education teachers described self-contained classrooms of the desegregation
era as “enhanced special ed classrooms” given “all the extra staff allocated to
[them].” For an analysis of paraprofessional reallocation to self-contained
classrooms, we examined trends in per pupil “excess cost” for LD3. Excess
cost is the difference between the costs of educating a disabled and a non-
disabled student.
Figure 9 shows trends for MSD’s LD3 excess cost relative to its LD1 ex-
cess cost (columns) and relative to the national average excess cost for LD3
(solid line). In 1973, per pupil excess cost for LD1 was approximately 10%
less than that for LD3 (12 0.91)—a common difference given the extra ex-
penditures for specialized staff and services in self-contained classrooms
(Parrish 1996). But the difference grew to 27% by 1979 (1 2 0:73) and
34% in 1982 (1 2 0:66). In terms of amount, LD1 excess cost dropped by
$469 from 1973 to 1982 or nearly $60 per year per student, while that of
LD3 rose by $823, about $100 per year per student. Although not enough
to raise controversy in any single year, these changes indicate that, in aggre-
gate, MSD raised resources per pupil in LD3 when whites dominated it.
Also, data not reported by grade level may have obscured the scope of re-
source reallocations to a degree. Since reallocations likely occurred only
in elementary and middle schools, and not in high schools, isolating excess
cost information for pre–high school gradesmay reveal differences favoring
LD3 greater than what is discernible from data available from the district.
In 1983, the chairperson of the paraprofessional chapter of MSD’s teacher
union was quoted in the media as saying she “received complaints from
[regular] teachers . . . about problems caused by the declining number of
aides [paraprofessionals] for students with learning disabilities.” In the same
story, an elementary school parent was quoted as asserting that “students234
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
F
IG
.9
.—
L
D
1
an
d
L
D
3
ex
ce
ss
co
st
s
in
M
S
D
fo
r
av
ai
la
b
le
ye
ar
s.
C
os
ts
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
re
p
or
te
d
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
s
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.A
ll
co
st
s
ar
e
ex
-
p
re
ss
ed
in
19
90
d
ol
la
rs
.U
n
ev
en
in
te
rv
al
s
on
th
e
ye
ar
ax
is
ar
e
d
is
p
la
ye
d
ev
en
ly
fo
r
v
is
u
al
si
m
p
lic
it
y.
M
S
D
co
st
s
w
er
e
ob
ta
in
ed
fr
om
M
S
D
of
fi
ci
al
s.
N
at
io
n
al
av
er
ag
es
fo
r
L
D
3
ex
ce
ss
co
st
fo
r
19
73
,1
97
9,
19
82
,a
n
d
19
96
ar
e
fr
om
fo
u
r
d
if
fe
re
n
t
fe
d
er
al
ly
fu
n
d
ed
sp
ec
ia
l
ed
u
ca
ti
on
fi
n
an
ce
st
u
d
ie
s
(c
it
at
io
n
s
n
ot
p
ro
v
id
ed
to
p
ro
te
ct
si
te
an
on
ym
it
y
si
n
ce
ci
ta
ti
on
s
re
v
ea
l
th
e
ye
ar
s
of
M
S
D
’s
co
u
rt
ca
se
).
T
h
e
n
at
io
n
al
av
er
ag
e
fo
r
19
91
($
5,
44
9)
is
th
e
au
th
or
s’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
b
as
ed
on
th
e
lin
ea
r
ye
ar
ly
ra
te
of
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
19
82
to
19
96
:3
,6
01
1
f½ð
6,
27
1
2
3,
60
1Þ
=ð
20
2
7Þ

ð1
6
2
7Þ
g.
N
o
fo
rm
al
n
at
io
n
al
st
u
d
ie
s
ex
is
t
fo
r
th
at
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r
ye
ar
.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
Allwith learning disabilities [in regular classrooms] were having difficulties be-
cause there were only a few aides to . . . relieve the teacher.” MSD records
offer no evidence of downsizing of paraprofessionals at the time. By 1991,
the second year of resegregation, LD1 excess cost inMSDwas 15% less than
that of LD3 (1 2 0:85). In 1996, a year after resegregation was completed,
it was 11% smaller (1 2 0:89), resembling the pre-desegregation difference
and suggesting that LD3 resources declined as whites returned to LD1.
Reviews of special education finance (Parrish 1996) indicate no national
changes in funding conventions for regular and self-contained classrooms
that could explain the shifts in MSD. The solid line in figure 9 compares
MSD’s LD3 excess cost to the national average. It was 26% greater than
the national average in 1973. This is consistent with differences in urban
districts to which states allocate additional funding, as low-income students
have more intensive needs than peers in the same categories in other dis-
tricts (Donovan and Cross 2002). But the difference grew to 34% by 1979
and 37% in 1982. Taking each trend individually, the national average
grew by about 11% ($3,250 to $3,601) compared to an increase of 23% in
MSD ($4,107 to $4,930). This pattern was reversed by 1991 when MSD’s
LD3 excess cost was 27% greater than the national average. It dropped
to 23% in 1996 following resegregation. Thus, with resegregation, MSD’s
LD3 excess cost moved closer to both its LD1 excess cost and the national
average for LD3 excess cost.What did attribute reinterpretation in LD3 involve?
Since the regular classroom is the customary setting for maximum access to
the full curriculum, disabled students in this setting interact with nondis-
abled peers and other disabled ones who receive instruction there. This is
seen as a social benefit of the regular classroom naturally coupled with
the full scope of curricular coverage. Because removal from this setting
can limit the student’s social experience, it is commonly a less desirable op-
tion unless genuinely warranted (Sailor 1989). Thus, white migration from
LD1 to LD3 in MSD required a change in valuation direction about sepa-
ration from the regular classroom—more separation had to be reinterpreted
as more beneficial than less separation in revaluing LD3, at least under con-
ditions of desegregation. Maintaining “quality education” by migrating to
LD3 was, for several white parents in our interview sample, a strategy that
implied not just curricular modifications to LD3 but the creation of a space
that was “quieter and less distracting” than the regular classroom, as one
mother put it. Three of the five white LD1 parents from early years of de-
segregation (all with children in elementary or middle school) addressed
how they and other parents feared that desegregation could make regular
classrooms “disorderly places if not managed well,” places in which their236
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Categorization by Organizationschildren may find it “difficult to focus” and may be “intimidated and iso-
lated from others.”Although such views reflect white prejudice about black
behavior generally, they were specifically tied, in this case, to concerns
with disabled blacks, who white parents feared could be “disruptive” and
“pose challenges to teachers and aides [paraprofessionals]” in regular class-
rooms. The same sentiment was conveyed by LDA’s president who, as
quoted above, claimed that the “judge didn’t know how distracting it
would be to bring kids with special needs from across town [black students]
into mainstream [regular] classrooms.” A white elementary special edu-
cation teacher, who came to MSD in the early 1980s, recalled how white
LD parents had come to believe that the self-contained classroomwas more
beneficial:All uThey did not view the regular class as better than the special ed [self-contained]
classroom. It was quite dumb really. . . . I was in a few [IEP] meetings when I
first came in and I tried to convince some parents [to favor the regular class-
room] and they sort of got mad. They genuinely believed their children would
be served better in a [self-contained] class. . . .They looked down upon services
in regular classes. The whole thing was upside down in [MSD] . . . unlike in my
previous job [in another district]. . . . But I was told [by school administration]
and some teachers that this is the way it is. It went on for a quite a while.This account is consistent with those from five other white and two black
teachers. They suggest that separation from the regular classroomwas a de-
sirable attribute of LD3 (for whites) under desegregation, provided, as our
findings indicate, that the full curriculum was delivered in self-contained
classrooms. Statements from six other white parents with LD children in
the middle years of desegregation support this. Our findings also shed light
on why whites preferred LD3 over LD2 in reaction to black access to LD1.
Unlike LD3s, LD2s spend only part of the day removed from the regular
classroom, for remedial instruction. Thus, LD2 normally is a higher status
category than LD3, but white LD2s in MSD would have had to be in reg-
ular classrooms for part of the school day, sharing an instructional space
that many white parents viewed as potentially disruptive. We also found
that separating white LDs from regular classrooms may have become an
organizationally preserved norm over time under conditions of desegrega-
tion. Four of the white parents with LD children in the middle years of de-
segregation commented on how IEP teammembers recommended the LD3
category rather than the parents themselves advocating for it. As one re-
called: “When my son was diagnosed with [LD], I wanted him to stay in
the regular class but the psychologist said the special ed [self-contained]
class was the best option. . . . I knew some of the teachers, they said the same
thing. . . . I was told at the [IEPmeeting] it was really up to me but they rec-
ommended against the regular class. They said he should be better off in the
[self-contained] class with better services and learning, so I went along. It237
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Allwas fine.” Interview data indicate that customary valuation patterns for
LD1 and LD3 were restored during resegregation. Six white parents in
our sample directly experienced this. All of them addressed how their chil-
dren were switched from LD3 to LD1 to maintain “good services.” As one
explained:238
 use sWe [she and her daughter] moved here from Florida in [1985] to stay with my
sister. . . . I knew there was a busing program at the time. . . .My fourth grade
daughter had [LD] and had been in the gen ed [regular] class [in Florida]. But
my sister said we should have her placed in the special ed [self-contained] class.
One of her three kids had been in one. . . .When busing ended we got our kids
out and had them put in the [regular classroom]. My daughter liked that. Many
parents in [the local school building] did that to maintain good services. The
special ed class was for more troubled kids [pointing her finger in the direction
of black neighborhoods]. It’s bad to say that, but still.Were black LD1s detrimental to regular classrooms?
Indesegregation, blackLD1smayhavebeen composed of twogroups: (1) those
whose impairments truly warranted the LD1 category (“true LD1s”) and
(2) those who may have been miscategorized as LD1 (“false LD1s”) because
of pressure for black access to LD1 and the effort to keep blacks out of LD3.
As noted in our discussion of figures 5 and 6, greater use of LD1 for blacks
was coupledwith lesser use of LD3 andED2.Thus, both true and false black
LD1s were plausibly students who otherwise may have been categorized as
having either a severe learning disability (LD3) or amoderate emotional dis-
turbance (ED2). MSD is likely to have maximized the number of true LD1s
to minimize instructional challenges and complications in compliance with
the court order. Eighteen of the 23 teachers in our sample were regular ed-
ucation teachers who taught blackLD1s at various points in the 1975–95 pe-
riod. Nearly all commented on how black LD1s were neither a burden nor
disruptive. As awhite teacherwho taughtmiddle schoolmath during the en-
tire time frame of our study elaborated: “[MSD] was apprehensive about
mainstreaming black special ed kids [placing them in regular classrooms] be-
fore busing. But they did just fine and they didn’t bug anybody. Some of
them didn’t even need the extra help. . . . Some needed more attention
[which]we couldn’t always provide sincewedidn’t have enough aides [para-
professionals]. So they fell behind at times but they never caused trouble.We
had to cover the whole curriculum. . . . So maybe they didn’t fulfill their full
potential, but they all came out OK.”
Lack of proper support for black LD1s and the possibility that somewere
false LD1s (because LD3 or ED2 categorization was more appropriate)
were unlikely sources of disruption in regular classrooms because of what
one teacher referred to as the “quiescent posture” of black LD1s. Accordingubject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Categorization by Organizationsto 9 of the 13 white teachers and 5 of the 10 black ones we interviewed,
black LD1s were often “allowed to remain passive and underperform[ing],”
“were not always given the opportunity to blend in,” and “received limited
attention”—a pattern observed in other districts as well (Carlberg and
Kavale 1980; Wright et al. 1982). As one white middle school math teacher,
who joined MSD in the mid-1980s, recalled: “[Black LD1s] usually didn’t
mix in. . . . Some struggled with the material [but] they rarely said anything.
You had to probe them a bit to know they didn’t get it. I think they felt em-
barrassed. I helped when I could but I wasn’t always successful since I had
to keep the class going. . . . We needed more aides.”
The “embarrassment” this and several other teachers observed may have
had different sources. For students with LDs—in this case, both the true
LD1s and those who may have been miscategorized as LD1 when they
needed to be LD3—requests for help in regular classrooms can be stigma-
tizing, especially when appropriate paraprofessional support is a lacking.
A black fourth grade teacher who was at MSD for much of the desegrega-
tion period explained this as follows:All uYou had to relate to them, or they’d be quiet.We are talking about a few special
needs kids in a whole class here. . . . It can be uncomfortable. . . . If you are not
getting all of what’s being taught, you’d ask for help once, or twice, or three
times, but in the end you’d stop [because] you wouldn’t want to be that kid
[who slows everyone down]. . . . They read well [in terms of decoding skills]
but I felt their interpretation skills were weaker. I paid attention and helped,
but I had to keep going in terms of the curriculum. See, that’s why you need
the aides, which we did not have enough of.For students with ED—in this case, false LD1s who needed to be ED2—an
additional source of embarrassment can be their particular impairment.
ED2sare likely to suffer from internalizingbehaviors, inwardlydirectedneg-
ative acts such as hesitation and social withdrawal (compared to ED3s who
often manifest disruptive outward acts such aggression and bullying; see
Gage 2013). Thus, ED2s miscategorized as LD1s may remain reserved
and quiescent in regular classrooms and underperform. This can be partic-
ularly acute without proper paraprofessional support, which several teach-
ers said was lacking.
For empirical tests of black LD1 effects on regular classrooms, we esti-
mated building-level correlations of nondisabled student achievement with
the number of black LD1s. We expressed the number of black LD1s in a
school as the share of enrollment. To reduce cross-sectional bias, we speci-
fied measures in terms of yearly change. For instance, for 1975–76, we cal-
culated the average change in math scores of nondisabled students in each
building and correlated it to the change in the share of black LD1s in the
buildings (n 5 135). This resulted in a coefficient of 0.03 (P 5 :90). Thus,
the change in the share of black LD1s in a school from 1975 to 1976 was un-239
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school. We repeated the procedure through 1989–90 and found similarly
small and nonsignificant effects (e.g., 0.03 in 1977–78; 0.02 in 1980–81
and 1983–84; 0.03 in 1986–87 and 1989–90). The results were similar for
reading (e.g., 0.02 in 1975–76; 0.03 in 1977–78; 0.02 in 1980–81, 1983–84,
1986–87, and 1989–90). The rejected hypothesis here is that the handful
of black LD1s in a few classrooms could impede overall learning in their
classrooms and thus reduce building-level achievement. To test the same hy-
pothesis differently, we correlated the change in the share of black LD1s to
the change in the standard deviation of nondisabled achievement. This is
important as learning losses for pockets of nondisabled students in a school
may show up less in the change in mean achievement than in the change
in the spread around that mean. All estimates for math and reading were
near zero (not exceeding 0.01 in any given year). We had similar findings
when we broke the analysis by grade level (elementary, middle school, high
school). At the high school level, we correlated the share of black LD1s sep-
aratelywith both the achievement of nondisabled peers and the achievement
ofwhite LD1s. This is because, aftermiddle school, white LDs switched from
LD3 to LD1 and shared regular classrooms with black LD1s in high school.
The share of black LD1s in a high school was unrelated to the achievement
of both nondisabled peers and white LD1s in the school. Significant learning
losses in regular classrooms attributable to black LD1s would have likely
raised controversy. We found no sign of this in media coverage or periodic
desegregation implementation reports, which included parent surveys. In-
stead, what seems to have happened is that MSD categorized greater num-
bers of blacks as LD1 as mandated by the court but did not provide proper
paraprofessional support, allowing these students to perform below their
potentials, while learning patterns were unaffected for others in regular
classrooms.Black Exclusion from White Categories
In categorical manipulation, the subordinate group is excluded from cate-
gories held by dominant groups. It is thus important to address how blacks
were excluded from LD3 during desegregation and from LD1 during reseg-
regation. Three of the eight black parents with children labeled LD in our
interview sample commented on how their children were switched from
LD3 to LD1 in early years of desegregation with negative consequences.
Their accounts are echoed in a vivid complaint from the parent of another
black LD student, voiced in a public meeting held in 1978: “My son used to
do better in the separate class [LD3], but now he is failing [in LD1]. He can’t
keep up. He is nervous. . . .The school says it is better for him. I couldn’t get
them to get him out of the common classroom [LD1]. . . .Hewas tested again240
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Categorization by Organizations[after the tests thatmade him eligible for LD1] but the result [categorization]
was the same. He is unhappy.”20
In the samemeeting, another black parent, whose son also was reassigned
from LD3 to LD1, complained about her son’s inability to “keep up with
classmates” and her unsuccessful “struggle . . . to place him [back] in a spe-
cial ed [self-contained] class.” MSD may have underestimated the IQ-
achievement discrepancy for some blacks by inflating their tests scores in
order to categorize them as LD1 when LD3 was more appropriate. But,
as noted above, significant test score swings were not observed for black
LD1s (compared to significant swings for whites LDs, shown in fig. 7).
There were hardly any black LD1s in any given year whose initial assign-
ment to LD1 was tied to a high test score that became notably lower in sub-
sequent years. Thus, it is more likely that IEP teams simply judged non-
manipulated IQ-achievement discrepancies for at least some blacks as
small enough to justify LD1 categorization even when LD3 may have been
a better choice. Ultimately, resulting grievances were rare, as LD1 normally
was a more desirable category than LD3 and parents were unlikely to com-
plain about LD1 categorization—particularly when resource reallocations
fromLD1 to LD3 (for paraprofessionals) were not high enough in any single
year to raise controversy and were not publicly well exposed and thus not
well understood.21 Yet the fact that there were some grievances about lim-
ited access to LD3 suggests black exclusion from LD3. As for resegregation,
blacks were increasingly excluded from LD1 when whites returned. But
this relied more on limiting the number of new black LD1s than on reas-
signing existing ones, reducing the risk of grievances about declining access.
Such grievances were absent in our interviews, media accounts, and desegre-
gation implementation reports. In 1989, one year before resegregation, there20 This was reported in a periodic desegregation implementation report submitted to the
court. Citation not provided to protect district anonymity.
21 The number of black parentswho could have complainedwas small to beginwith,which
can be deduced fromfig. 2A. In 1973, therewere about 930 black LD3s (0:015  62,000). It
is reasonable to question whether all 930 were appropriately categorized because, given
the racial bias in MSD, at least some of them plausibly could have been better served in
LD1 or LD2. This would mean that not all 930 were benefiting from their LD3 assign-
ment, and, conjecturally, their families may have appreciated leaving LD3. As for the re-
maining ones—arguably the “true LD3s”—even if all were forced into LD1 during deseg-
regation, not every one of them was likely to have parents who were dissatisfied with the
move andat the same time aware of the problemand efficacious enough to complain.With
regard to later years of desegregation, since LD3 was an increasingly unlikely destination
for blacks, the number of blacks who would have experienced a move from LD3 to LD1
was more limited than in earlier years. Thus, the number of black students who experi-
enced both LD3 and LD1, and who also had parents who could compare and complain,
was increasingly limited. This likely reduced the risk of complaints about LD1 assignment
by black parents whose children could have benefited more from LD3.
241
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Allwere about 935 black LD1s, which as seen in figure 2A, dropped slightly to
900 in 1990 (0:018  50,000). This indicates that resegregation was not cou-
pled with a speedy reassignment of black LD1s to other categories. But the
number of black LD1s dropped to 460 in 1993 (fig. 2A; 0.009  51,000). Of
these 460, 383 were among the 935 LD1s from 1989, meaning only 77 blacks
(460 2 383) were new to LD1, many of whom were also new to MSD. This
indicates a limited assignment of new blacks to LD1.22DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Resisting pressure for greater subordinate group access to high-status cate-
gories is a common means by which organizations perpetuate inequality.
We focus on a different modality of resistance, categorical manipulation.
Here, subordinate groups do gain significant access to high-status catego-
ries, but existing high- and low-status categories are reranked. Dominant
groups reaffiliate with low-status categories, which also may be revised
for improvements. Previously low-status categories become new markers
of distinction and territories of exclusion, while previously high-status cat-
egories suffer in rewards and value. We illustrate this in the context of how
schools rerank mild disability categories in response to pressure for greater
black access to a customarily majority-white, high-status category.
Categorical manipulation extends understanding of organizations’ role
in “categorical work” (Tilly 1998) in relation to inequality. Such work in-
volves not just creating and adopting categories and assigning people to
them in inequitable ways but also rearranging and reconstructing catego-
ries and reassigning people to them in ways that preserve disparities. This
extended view captures a broader variety of dynamics pertinent to the study
of organizations and inequality. Categorical manipulation may be rarer
than the more familiar modalities by which dominant group interests are
protected (e.g., closure, creating a new category), but rarity itself is signifi-
cant evidence of the basic insight that people invent, reinvent, and modify
categorizations to produce inequality. We contribute to the literature in
three specific ways. First, categorical manipulation is a previously unexam-
ined response type in the analysis of reactions to pressure for equality, one
that is not fully captured by familiar concepts such as symbolic compliance,
ritualization, tokenism, cooptation, and defiance. Second, categorical ma-
nipulation injects a bidirectional view of status competition into researchWedetermined the new enrollees toMSDby using the transaction code information in
tudent records (see table 1). Transaction codes also helped determine that among the
52 blacks who were LD1 in 1989 but not in 1993 (935 2 383), about 8% graduated,
2% dropped out, and 15% withdrew from MSD. Most of the remaining 65%—about22
s
5
1
360 LD1s—were gradually recategorized as LD3 and, in a few cases, ED2.
242
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Categorization by Organizationson organizations and inequality, one that accounts not for just upward but
also for downward movements along the hierarchy of status markers in
competition for advantage. And third, categorical manipulation helps high-
light the activity environment where clients, audiences, and constituencies
are categorized. This context involves a wide spectrum of malleable cate-
gorical arrangements, offering ample opportunities to examine their manip-
ulation. Thus, future research can explore categorical manipulation not just
in the employment context but also in the activity environment.Guideposts for Examining Categorical Manipulation
Below we summarize elements that are important to address in the study of
categorical manipulation, which future work can extend and modify.
Address compliance and reaffiliation.—The first step is to substantiate
that subordinate group access to high-status categories is not tokenistic or
ritualistic and that dominant group reaffiliation with low-status categories
is correlated to subordinate group access to high-status categories.
Test alternative reasons andmotives for reaffiliation.—In categorical ma-
nipulation, downward movement by dominant groups occurs specifically
to maintain advantage, not for other reasons. In the MSD case, we tested
alternative reasons for white migration to LD3, such as school capacity.
We also relied on interview and other archival data (media accounts, court
reports) to show that white resistance to sharing special education services
for “quality education” was a principal factor in migration to LD3.
Address how reaffiliation occurred.—Since malleability is a scope condi-
tion for categoricalmanipulation, inquiry can address which aspects ofmal-
leability enabled reaffiliation and how.We provided strong evidence on test
score deflation as a means of white migration to LD3. This strategy was
plausible given the latent nature and the limited direct observability of
IQ-achievement discrepancy as a yardstick for LD severity. The strategy
was possible also because of the limited uniformity in categorization rules
and procedures. Test score deflation may have been combined with other
factors enabling reaffiliation—such as subjective judgments at play in
IEP meetings—but these were beyond the scope of our data.
Address whether categorical revision occurred and, if so, how.—Mallea-
bility also enables revision to low-status categories. Documenting attribute
alterations and reinterpretations provides evidence on how low-status cat-
egories are revalued. We did this by examining resource reallocations from
LD1 to LD3 (regarding paraprofessional support) and by addressing how
white parents reinterpreted more separation from the regular classroom
as more desirable than less separation under conditions of desegregation.
Address exclusion from low-status categories.—Illustrating subordinate
group exclusion from previously low-status categories and examining243
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MSD, student records showed limited black presence in LD3 when the cat-
egory was white dominated, but we lacked direct evidence of how blacks
were excluded fromLD3. Plausibly, IEP teams judged IQ-achievement dis-
crepancies for at least some black LDs as small enough to justify LD1 cat-
egorization when LD3 was a better choice. Our qualitative data indicate
that black parents were unable to switch their children from LD1 to LD3
even when they demanded it. But grievances about exclusion from LD3
were rare in MSD, as LD1 normally was more desirable than LD3 and
many black parents may not have been aware of or efficacious enough to
complain about the LD1 category when LD3 was more appropriate. This,
however, is an idiosyncratic aspect of the MSD case, as subordinate groups
may be aware of and systematically oppose exclusion from previously low-
status categories in other cases, even though they may lack the power to ul-
timately prevent exclusion.
Address transiency and selectivity.—Two other elements are important
to address in future research. They are based on our empirical findings.
The first is transiency, or the temporary nature of categorical manipulation.
In MSD, the traditional categorical hierarchy and patterns of racial assign-
ments were restored when pressure for equality ended. This shows that cat-
egorical manipulation need not be permanent and that it prevails as long as
it helps maintain privilege. Thus, observations of “categorical restoration”
can strengthen the evidence on the strategic nature of categorical manipula-
tion and further substantiate the role of power in such manipulation and in
group relations more generally. As Halnon (2002) notes, dominant group
power figures into the adoption and abandonment of low-status categories.
The second element is selectivity regarding choices about (a) which low-
status category to adopt when more than one is available and (b) how much
of the low-status category to adopt. Manipulation in MSD occurred along
lines of instructional placement within the same label (LD1 and LD3) and
did not involve different labels (LD vs. MR/ED). This is likely because
switching labels may have required overcoming racially nuanced stigma as-
sociated with MR or ED and may have been more difficult than changing
instructional placement. Moreover, sticking to a traditionally white label
(i.e., LD) and manipulating the categories within it was a more efficient op-
tion as long as it helped maintain advantage. Evidence on such selectivity
can further highlight the strategic nature of categorical manipulation. Relat-
edly, migration to LD3 did not extend to high school because of the infeasi-
bility of offering the full high school curriculum in self-contained classrooms.
Whites were selective about which “slice” of LD3 to adopt. Observing such
dynamics strengthens evidence on the strategic nature of categorical manip-
ulation. Selectivity reveals how dominant groups pick status-enhancing fea-
tures and reject status-harming ones when adopting low-status categories.244
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Categorization by OrganizationsConclusion
Organizations often resist pressure for change by limiting their compliance
with a given demand or by decoupling compliance from functional activi-
ties. Categorical manipulation addresses how even full compliance with a
demand (e.g., ending subordinate group exclusion from high-status catego-
ries) may not result in genuine change, as the organization may enact other
changes alongside its compliance in order to reduce or nullify intended
benefits of compliance (e.g., reranking existing high- and low-status catego-
ries). In this regard, categorical manipulation may be viewed as a case of a
broader class of “countervailing responses” limiting change. Conceivably,
mortgage lenders may comply with consumer protection rules that limit
profits but also create new products violating the spirit of the law, the effects
of which are not well understood or readily detectable. Food producers may
incur new costs by complying with pressures to abandon cheap, harmful in-
gredients but recover losses by lowering the quality of other ingredients to
legal minimums. Crozier (1964) offers a classic example of a countervailing
dynamic in which petty officials in French provincial administrations re-
sisted innovation efforts of prefects they viewed as trespassing on their
sphere of influence. While petty officials complied with prefects’mandates,
they also engaged in incessant rule following in other tasks to disrupt inno-
vation efforts.We illustrate how compliancewith a demand for equality can
be part of a broader strategy tomaintain inequality. Future research can ad-
dress different patterns of countervailing responses that may occur in other
situations of demand for change.
Discriminatory acts vary in visibility. Some are undisguised (e.g., Jim
Crow laws),while others aremore obscure (e.g., implicit racism in job promo-
tions). This distinction pertains to categorical manipulation, too. Depending
on conditions, elements of the process may be readily visible, such that spe-
cific actions and actors are easily identifiable, or the process may involve
varying degrees of whatMorrill, Zald, and Rao (2003) call “social occlusion.”
Various actions related to categorical manipulation in MSD transpired out-
side of public view, such as in demarcated group settings like the LDAmeet-
ings or in bureaucratic settings like IEPmeetings or principals’ offices, where
actions may be shielded from scrutiny. None of the actions were secret, but
they often were undetectable unless one knew to look for them and to view
them as elements of a process bywhich inequality ismaintained. Such obscu-
rity is not an inherent feature of categorical manipulation, but, since the con-
cept treats compliancewith a demand for equality as part of an effort tomain-
tain inequality, it can expose discriminatory acts coupled with compliance
that may otherwise remain unexplored. Thus, categorical manipulation ex-
tends inquiry’s reach into organizations’ “dark side,”where benevolent acts can
be a means of distracting attention away from harmful ones (Vaughn 1999).245
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nized limits on regulation. Research on organizations and inequality views
flaws in antidiscrimination regulation as a principal factor enabling evasion
of pressure for equality. Specifically, when regulation involves a high degree
of legal ambiguity (i.e., vague language on objectives, greater emphasis on
bureaucratic rituals thanon substantivemethods for equity, orweak enforce-
ment mechanisms; Edelman 1992), organizations can evade change by rein-
terpreting and ceremonializingmandates (Sutton andDobbin 1996). This in-
sight’s utility focuses attention onweaknesses of regulation itself,with limited
recognition of the degree to which a given domain of categorization is reg-
ulatable in thefirst place: Is aweakregulation “weak”because less ambiguous
laws are absent albeit possible or because the targeted domain precludes
more effective laws?Highlymalleable categorical arrangements are less open
to regulation given limits on the strength and utility of categorization rules
and procedures and given the role judgment or taste can play in determining
category attributes and in interpreting themforvaluation.Milddisability cat-
egories are a case in point, as they are highly open to reaffiliation and revision.
In MSD, this precluded the court’s ability to set clear and strong guidelines
and monitoring mechanisms to enforce genuine equity in mild disability cat-
egorization, in effect enabling categorical manipulation. Contextual limits on
regulative clarity and strength are not lost onEdelman (1992),who notes that
legal ambiguity stems partly from the difficulty of formalizing and monitor-
ing human activity and decisions, introducing indeterminacy in any setting.
But independent of this, settings themselves vary in how they impose inde-
terminacy regardless of actors’ preferences for or against regulative strength.
Under conditions of high malleability, strong pressure for equality may trig-
ger categorical manipulation because the context itself may not permit regu-
lation to prevent or even expose such manipulation. In fact, under such con-
ditions, organizations may not resist demands for equal access to high-status
categories because they canmaintain dominant group privilege by helping to
reverse the hierarchy of existing categories.246
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